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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about boilerplate language located at the back of
contracts drafted by the world's largest law firms. The clauses in
question are process provisions that regulate the amendment of
sovereign debt contracts. These paragraphs have been drafted and
redrafted by generations of corporate lawyers, yet they have changed
little in their broad outlines in more than a century of use. Now they
take center stage in the global financial arena, where they govern
billions of dollars (and pounds, euros, and yen) of sovereign debt in
default and billions more in imminent risk of default. Officials,
academics, and even some of the lawyers who drafted the clauses now
want the clauses removed because they make defaulted debt difficult
to restructure.
How did this arcane preserve of the bond lawyer come to be the
cutting edge in the evolution of international financial architecture?
Whereas private debt defaults lead to bankruptcy, sovereign debt
defaults lead to informal, often lengthy standstills. The creditors can
wait out the period of distress, expecting eventual economic recovery
to lead to a resumption of payments. But, for the most part, payment
resumption requires that creditors come to the negotiating table to
rewrite the defaulted debt contracts. Such a "composition" or
"restructuring" scales down the sovereign's obligations and causes it to
return to health quickly. In theory, this makes both the sovereign and
its creditors better off.
There are practical barriers to be overcome before a
composition can be concluded. These stem from information
asymmetries, from coordination problems, or from complex bargaining
dynamics. Sovereign compositions tend to be tripartite negotiations.
In addition to the sovereign and the existing creditors, international
financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
come to the table holding out new loans. In theory, these loans are
conditional, requiring the sovereign to reform its economic policies and
the unpaid creditors to share the pain by cutting back their claims to
induce lending that facilitates economic recovery. In practice, the IMF
often acts precipitously, bailing out the sovereign so as to stabilize the
international financial system or satisfy some other political goal of its
major shareholders. The prospect of a bailout diminishes the creditors'
incentive to come to the bargaining table to make concessions.
Assuming bargaining commences, the bond contracts contain
boilerplate clauses, called "unanimous action clauses" (or "UACs"),
that erect a barrier to success. These clauses, which condition
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amendment of the bond contracts' key payment terms on unanimous
bondholder consent, govern the majority of sovereign bonds
outstanding. A minority of bond contracts contain "collective action
clauses" (or "CACs"), which permit across-the-board amendments with
a three-quarters majority. Whereas CACs facilitate restructuring of
the defaulting sovereign's debt, UACs stand in the way. With
thousands of bondholders dispersed around the globe, coordinating a
unanimous vote is difficult, if not impossible. Further, a unanimous
vote requirement invites free riding: Because the transaction makes
the group as a whole better off, an opportunistic bondholder has an
incentive to "hold out"-to withhold its essential vote in hopes of
procuring a side payment from the transaction's proponents.
The cumulation of frictions has led to calls for the institution of
a sovereign bankruptcy regime. This would resemble corporate
bankruptcy reorganization, albeit tailored for sovereign debt. The IMF
has proposed a minimal bankruptcy architecture, one that would
trump UACs and facilitate restructuring in a majority action
framework. The United States Treasury agreed on the need for
majority action, but has registered a contractarian objection to the
IMF's plan for a new statutory scheme: Since UACs lie at the core of
the problem and UACs are contract terms, the solution lies in
persuading the market to rewrite sovereign bond contracts rather
than in overriding them with an international mandate. Now that the
official sector refuses to bail out every sovereign in distress, Argentina
being the most prominent example, UACs constitute less of a strategic
advantage. On the assumption that CACs are otherwise superior to
UACs in terms of efficiency, the Treasury projects that sovereign
bondholders will willingly exchange their UAC bonds for CAC bonds,
ameliorating the coordination problems. Sovereign debt restructuring
can then go forward in a framework of free contract.
Sovereign bondholders and sovereign borrowers at first
rejected both proposals-the IMF's bankruptcy plan and the
Treasury's spontaneous bond exchange suggestion. These real parties
in interest preferred the status quo. But their motives were suspect.
To the extent that the status quo makes unconditional IMF bailouts
more likely, the sovereigns and their lenders have reason to oppose
reform, whether mandatory or contractual.1 Official sector pressure
1. For a recent overview of the "financial architecture debate," see Barry Eichengreen,
Restructuring Soveriegn Debt: Analytical Issues and Policy Proposals, J. ECON. PERSP.
(forthcoming Fall 2004); Peter B. Kenen, The International Financial Architecture: Old Issues
and New Initiatives, 5 INT'L FIN. 23, 26 (2002); Marcus Miller, Postscript Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts-Or No Change?, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS,
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has since broken the pattern of universal market opposition. A
handful of sovereign issuers have successfully departed from market
practice and include CACs in new bonds. The present question is
whether this development heralds a market-wide shift to CACs as
advocated by the Treasury.
This Article inquires into the causes of this multiparty dispute.
It takes a new look at the economics of sovereign lending, identifying
interests fundamental to the sovereign debtor-creditor relationship
that have been obscured in a debate focused largely on opportunism
occasioned by IMF bailout lending. This different focus leads us to
identify unsound premises on both sides of the dispute between
contract and mandate.
The contractarians propound a "free lunch" theory of sovereign
lending. They assume that CACs are a first best improvement over
UACs, and that a transition to CACs holds out a surplus for all parties
to share. Unfortunately, no such twenty-dollar bill has been left lying
on the table. In our view, sovereign lenders rationally could prefer
UACs to CACs, and could do so even in a world without IMF bailout
lending. It follows, on a worst-case scenario, that engrained resistance
will prevent a voluntary, market-wide transition to CAC bonds, and
that a majority action regime may be achieved only on a mandatory
basis. On a best-case scenario, it follows that frictions will impede a
market transition from UACs to CACs. If the international financial
community wishes the incipient transition to become general and
remain stable, it will have to pay for it. Yet it is unclear where the
money would come from to pay UAC bondholders to trade their bonds
for CAC bonds. In the alternative, the IMF will have to intervene
aggressively, forcing model contract terms on sovereign borrowers by
threatening penalties for those who borrow with UACs. The best-case
scenario, thus characterized, is essentially mandatory intervention.
We accordingly agree with sovereign bankruptcy proponents
who doubt that the markets will spontaneously and quickly shift from
UACs to CACs once participants realize that bailouts are no longer
readily available. But we also suggest that the bondholder community
and the sovereign debtors have legitimate reasons for remaining
suspicious of bankruptcy proposals. The IMF's proposal rests on a
triad of majority action, cost savings, and administrative convenience
as it simultaneously attempts to address the need for a better
framework for bailout lending and to rationalize the process of
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 183, 185 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eds., 2003)
(describing the evolution of the conflict between the IMF and United States Treasury positions
since April 1, 2002).
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sovereign debt composition. These elements do not import a
persuasive normative grounding for a bankruptcy regime. The
economics of sovereign lending suggest a stronger, contract-based
norm-the best interest of creditors, 2 defined as whatever the unpaid
lenders freely approve. Under the norm, only the creditors themselves
should determine whether a given composition serves their best
interests. It follows that a sovereign bankruptcy process should not
attempt to replicate the transactional bias of American corporate
reorganization, where the need to close the deal can override other
concerns. In the sovereign context, the long-run interests of defaulting
sovereigns and their creditors are more closely aligned than those of
defaulting private borrowers and creditors. If sovereign creditors do
not like the restructuring on offer, it must be allowed to fail.
Under this view, a sovereign bankruptcy regime need do little
more than trump UACs with CACs and then leave the parties to
renegotiate their contracts. With CACs in place (however imposed),
the parties can be remitted to the law governing their contracts-the
law of the State of New York in most cases-without needing the
assistance of a bankruptcy infrastructure.
But one problem remains with this minimal approach, a
problem stemming from the contractual jurisprudence of sovereign
debt.3 Once a renegotiation framework is established, a given
creditor's worst enemy may be neither the defaulting sovereign nor
the IMF, but another creditor or group of creditors with conflicting
interests. The contract law of New York is undeveloped on the
question of whether sovereign creditors owe one another meaningful
good faith duties. The law of private debtor-creditor relations,
meanwhile, rejects the suggestion that creditors should owe duties to
one another, leaving the job of constraining opportunistic behavior
within the creditor group to the bankruptcy system.4 Over a century
ago, however, in the period antedating the federal statutory
reorganization regime, intercreditor duties did exist. As we see it, the
2. As distinguished from the "best interests of creditors" as used in the jurisprudence of
corporate bankruptcy in the United States. See infra text accompanying note 123. Coming at the
problem from a different angle, economist Andrei Shleifer has also recently argued for a norm of
"the best interest of creditors." See ANDREI SHLEIFER, WILL THE SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKET
SURVIVE? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9493, 2003).
3. The closest the economics literature gets to recognizing this point is Barry
Eichengreen's observation that debtor-creditor negotiations have been quick to produce results
when the parties have shown good faith. Barry Eichengreen, Crisis Resolution: Why We Need a
Krueger-Like Process to Obtain a Taylor-Like Result 5 (Apr. 29, 2002),
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/policy/iiekrueger.pdf.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 207-227.
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matter of intercreditor equity became cabined in the federal
bankruptcy reorganization regime after that regime appeared in 1934.
Thereafter, state case law on intercreditor equity atrophied, replaced
by a regime of contractual self-protection. A viable framework for
sovereign restructuring, whether contract based or encapsulated in a
bankruptcy regime, needs an adjudicatory authority willing to impose
good faith duties across groups of creditors.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II draws on the economics
and practice of sovereign lending to assert that sovereign bankruptcy
proposals should not be driven exclusively by the bailout problem.
Reform proposals need to address the fundamentals of sovereign
debtor-creditor relationships that operate independently of IMF
intervention. These fundamentals help to articulate a contract-based
norm, the best interest of creditors.
Part III looks at the sovereign bankruptcy movement to show
that the best interest norm already has influenced its participants,
albeit implicitly. The most prominent proposal, that of the IMF, has
evolved towards both minimalism and creditor involvement. Some of
what the IMF proposes to provide, however, is either unnecessary or
inimical to the creditors' best interests. Most importantly, it is unclear
that the IMF's involvement in the administration of such a system
adds anything of value to either the sovereigns or their creditors.
Part IV appraises the CAC versus UAC debate. Here we
encounter a puzzle: the persistent use for more than a century of
UACs in New York-based sovereign debt issues and CACs in London-
based debt issues. A frequent explanation of this puzzle centers on the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939,5 which embeds the UAC in publicly
issued corporate bond contracts in the United States,6 therefore
implying that a path dependency constrains the drafting of New York
sovereign contracts. We reject this contract failure explanation and
propose instead a multiple equilibrium explanation. Under this
explanation, UACs and CACs are both rational solutions to an
intractable problem. The choice between the two entails trade offs,
and is a matter of lender preference under uncertainty rather than a
function of an efficiency calculation. One factor leading lenders to
favor UACs is the lack of a good faith backstop, which results in a
need for self-protection. Holding out is the only weapon one has in a
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (2000).
6. For discussion, see Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J.
232, 250-51 (1987).
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world in which creditors motivated by side deals can impose
suboptimal compositions by majority rule.
Part V projects that such side deals and giveaways will occur if
sovereign debt compositions are negotiated under CACs. Resolution of
these disputes, therefore, requires a robust good faith principle. We
draw on the history of corporate reorganization prior to the enactment
of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 19347 to show that courts have
grappled with these questions before, intervening on equitable
principles.
II. RELATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
Discussions of sovereign debt reform have focused primarily on
what mechanisms can be borrowed from the corporate bankruptcy
context. Little attention has been paid to the differences between the
economics of the two contexts and these differences' implications for a
sovereign bankruptcy regime. This part performs that task.8
A. Background
Today's sovereign default crisis follows from the growth of the
market for emerging country debt in the 1990s. Between 1992 and
1997, credit flowed copiously into emerging markets, averaging $154
billion a year. 9 But risk perceptions in the emerging country debt
market changed after a succession of financial crises-in Mexico in
1995 and then in East Asia and Russia in 1997 and 1998.10 Demand
for emerging market securities dropped to $50 billion per year in the
period from 1998 to 2000.11 A full-blown crisis ensued in 2001, when
7. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (repealed 1938).
8. INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
MECHANISM-FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS (2002) (performing an analogous function in the
context of IMF policy and planning), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/ 112702.pdf.
9. In hindsight, much of this investment looks to have been overoptimistic, based on
inadequate information about emerging nations' economic, political, and institutional problems.
See Guillermo A. Calvo, Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in Emerging Markets,
LACEA Presidential Address (Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.
edu.ar/jemi/2002/trabajo2.pdf. Lenders may have underestimated the likelihood of liquidity
crises and other economic distress. Alternatively, they may have assumed that troubled
sovereigns would be bailed out by the IMF. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion,
and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 613 (2001) (arguing that
international organization into nation-states causes continuing global vulnerability to financial
crises), available at http://www.oup.co.uk/jielaw/hdbNolume_4/ Issue_04/pdf/040613.pdf.
10. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 89-98, 119-27, 142-51 (2002).
11. John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at Institute
for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/ releases/po2056.htm.
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Argentina, its economy in collapse, defaulted without the benefit of an
emergency credit facility from the IMF. 12 The flow of debt to emerging
market governments in 2002 slowed to under $12 billion-a trickle
compared to the flows of 1992-97.13 This sovereign debt crisis follows
other emerging market (and particularly Latin American) defaults of
the 1930s and 1980s.
Argentina's default changed the rules of the game in sovereign
lending. In the mid 1990s, emergency credit provided by the IMF (and
the United States Treasury) cured the liquidity crises of countries like
Mexico and the East Asian tigers. Arguably, a two-sided moral hazard
problem resulted. One defective incentive lay with the sovereigns.
Rehabilitation was achieved on an accelerated timetable thanks to the
IMF's financial backing. We suspect that the IMF made these
investments less for the purpose of rehabilitation than for the
purposes of preventing contagion from spreading through the
international financial system and protecting its political interests.
The moral hazard problem of insured credit resulted. If the IMF was
going to come in with cash, prudent borrowing made no sense. The
second defective incentive lay with the private lenders. Some of the
IMF's emergency funding, provided to forestall further crises, went
directly into the pockets of banks and bondholders. Until the IMF
found a way out of this bailout trap, sovereign lending threatened to
become a high interest-low risk free lunch. 14
These incentive problems have been ameliorated in recent
times. Defaults by Russia and Argentina terminated the expectation
that all large economies would be bailed out. At the same time, the
IMF has conditioned loans to Ukraine and Ecuador, both suffering
liquidity crises, on bondholder concessions.1 5 "Constructive ambiguity"
now describes the posture of the official sector, and private lenders
now proceed at their own risk. But amelioration does not mean
solution.1 6 The bailouts of Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay in 200217
For more detailed data on capital flows to emerging market economies, see INST. OF INT'L FIN.,
INC., CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (2002).
12. Arturo C. Porrzecanski, Dealing with Sovereign Debt: Trends and Implications, in
SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 27-33 (Chris Jachnick & Fraser Preston eds., forthcoming
2004).
13. See A Better Way to Go Bust, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 64, 64 (reporting the latest
statistics out of the Institute of International Finance).
14. Tarullo, supra note 9, at 649-51, discusses these problems in detail.
15. Id. at 650.
16. For discussion, see id. at 631-32, 649-51.
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mean that incentive problems persist. The IMF still has reason to seek
a means by which to force bondholders to participate in emergency
rehabilitations, scaling down their claims as a condition to the
provision of emergency loans. A sovereign bankruptcy regime looms
large as the means to this end.
What is good for the IMF also may be good economic policy:
Bondholder free rides on IMF bail outs are distortionary; lenders to
distressed sovereigns should do no better than they would have done
in the absence of an emergency credit facility. But it does not follow
that what is good for the IMF necessarily makes for good economic
policy: A bankruptcy procedure suited to the IMF's institutional
preferences could also be distortionary and costly if it made lenders to
a distressed sovereign worse off than they would have been in its
absence (and in the absence of IMF bailout lending).
Just as bankruptcy's superiority over contractual composition
cannot be assumed, nor can the IMF's cost-benefit perspective be
accorded automatic hegemony.18 The IMF's perspective dominates the
discussion over bondholder objections because the bondholders are
dismissed as opportunists, who are simply attempting to sustain the
flow of rents from bailouts. This dismissal is precipitous.
Consideration also must be given to a new regime's impact on the
fundamentals of the sovereign debtor-creditor relationship, viewed
independently of the moral hazard problem stemming from the IMF's
interventions.
This Part assays the incentive structure of sovereign lending. If
law reform is to create value, it cannot model sovereign lenders only
as economic opportunists. They also must be viewed as lenders who
can take capital elsewhere if reform fails to address their concerns. We
describe this zone of concern as "the best interest of creditors."
B. Corporate and Sovereign Borrowing Compared
Borrowers and lenders are natural enemies, more likely to
conform to economic predictions of self-interest than human beings in
most other relationships. Before the loan is made, the vulnerabilities
lie on the borrower's side. The borrower needs the credit that the
lender remains free to refuse. Once the loan closes, however, the
vulnerabilities shift. The borrower walks away with the lender's
17. For a discussion of these crises and the private and official sector responses, see William
R. Cline, "Private Sector Involvement": Definition, Measurement, and Implementation (Aug.
2002), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/conferences/conf0207/ cline.pdf.
18. See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 195-213.
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funds. Nine-tenths of the borrower's contractual expectations are
fulfilled. Meanwhile, the lender begins a contractual journey fraught
with exposure to economic risk and human opportunism. For
protection, the private lender relies on the legal regime that enforces
the promise to pay.
Sovereign debt is different. It presents a puzzle, for the
sovereign lender has no recourse to a reliable enforcement authority. 19
For the most part, sovereign obligations cannot be directly enforced in
the sovereign obligor's own courts.20 A century ago, gunboat diplomacy
by creditor governments sometimes took the lawsuit's place.21 But the
gunboats have been mothballed. Now the sovereign creditor's only
direct recourse lies in the courts of countries like the United States
and the United Kingdom, which by statute have relaxed the
traditional sovereign immunity barrier.22 But an unpaid lender takes
up this enforcement opportunity only in the exceptional case. Going to
court in a G-7 (or similar) country is beneficial only if the lender
identifies property of the defaulting sovereign in that jurisdiction (or
in another jurisdiction willing to levy execution on the first
jurisdiction's judgment). And defaulting sovereigns try their best not
to leave valuables lying around.
Even if an avenue of direct enforcement opens up, the
sovereign creditor is at a disadvantage relative to its corporate
counterpart. Unlike a defaulting corporate borrower, a sovereign
cannot be liquidated. Nor can a composition that scales down a
sovereign's obligations to a manageable level be effected at the
expense of an equity interest, as occurs in corporate reorganizations.
19. See, e.g., Charles Lipson, The IMF, Commercial Banks, and Third World Debts, in DEBT
AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 317, 322-23 (Joshua D. Aranson ed., 1979) (describing the
central puzzle in sovereign debt as that of why "so many states, with such diverse political
structures, continue to service debts in spite of the political and social costs").
20. See Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors, 37 INT'L LAW. 103, 116-
17 (2003).
21. See, e.g., Paul de Grauve & Michael Fratianni, The Political Economy of International
Lending, 4 CATO J. 147, 158 (1984). The assertion that gunboat diplomacy played a role in
inducing countries to pay their debts has been challenged forcefully in a recent book by political
scientist Mike Tomz, who says that the primary reason that countries repay debts is in order to
maintain or improve their reputations. See Michael R. Tomz, Sovereign Debt and International
Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and Repayment 12-48 (Oct. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). The fear of sanctions, according to Tomz, has never been a
primary motivating factor for sovereign debt repayment. Id. at 49-79.
22. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-
1611 (2000); State Immunities Act, 1978, 26 & 27 Eliz. 2, c. 33, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123
(1978).
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The sovereign's citizens are its equity interest and its debt deals do
not contemplate their being "wiped out" for the benefit of creditors. 23
The lender's powerlessness leaves the sovereign borrower with
a disincentive to pay, and the borrower will default whenever the
expected value of future financing falls below its present debt
servicing costs. 24 Even though the sovereign debt contract is drafted to
address and facilitate the possibility of conventional enforcement, the
contract does not come close to guaranteeing that a sovereign able to
pay will perform its promise. Unlike corporate borrowers, sovereigns
do not necessarily default because they cannot pay. Whereas corporate
defaults follow from the exhaustion of resources, sovereign defaults
can be acts of political will. Sovereign distress can ripen into default
when actors in the national government decide that the tax burden
and administrative costs of debt service are intolerable and that the
burden of payment (political as well as economic) outweighs the costs
of default. 25 For example, only one of the nations in default in the
Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s owed as much as 1 percent of
gross national product.26
Why, then, do lenders extend credit to sovereigns? The answer
is that sovereigns try hard to pay. As a practical matter, their defaults
tend to presuppose economic reverses, whether due to
mismanagement or bad luck. Sovereigns rarely repudiate their debt
contracts in whole. Defaults are partial, leading to the rescheduling of
obligations and, in some cases, their reduction.27 Historically, defaults
by sovereigns have been common even as sovereign loans overall have
been profitable.28 Consider Eichengreen and Portes' figures on
sovereign issues of the 1920s. Coupons were 7 to 8 percent. Defaults
lowered actual rates of return to 5 percent for London issues and 4.6
percent for New York issues. United States Treasury bonds yielded 4.1
23. See Jeremy Bulow, Debt and Default: Corporate vs. Sovereign, in NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 579 (Murray Milgate & John Eatwell eds., 1992) (setting forth
the most striking differences between corporate and sovereign bankruptcy as being in terms of
"collateral, control, and continuity").
24. John Maynard Keynes, Foreign Investment and National Advantage, NATION &
ATHENEUM, Aug. 9, 1924, at 584, 585.
25. Jonathan Eaton, Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts, 4 J.
ECON. PERSP. 43, 48-49 (1990).
26. That country was Chile. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting
Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155, 156 (1989).
27. See Lee C. Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June
1991, at 12 (discussing sorting of creditors in the course of restructuring).
28. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 621, 621 n.1 (2000) (citing study by Lindert and Morton of 1552 sovereign issues of
ten governments from 1850 to 1983).
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percent during the period. Although defaults were frequent, outright
repudiations were rare, and payments in abeyance recommenced as
distress passed.29
The historical pattern implies that default causes negative
consequences to sovereigns. Defaulting sovereigns eventually must
return to the credit markets. 30 The need for continued access to credit
imports an incentive to pay. At the same time, the enforcement threat,
built into the debt contracts but rarely used in practice, imposes a
residuum of costs.
Economic accounts of sovereign debt relationships formalize
this description. Armed with their analysis, sovereign debt looks less
paradoxical.
C. Theories of Sovereign Debt
The economics of sovereign debt builds on the following axiom:
Unless default imposes costs on the debtor, not only will the debtor
not pay the debt, the lender will not make the loan in the first place. 31
As the cost of default decreases, so does the sovereign's borrowing
capacity. Contrariwise, as the cost of default increases, it at some
point becomes so high as to foreclose strategic default.32 Strategic
default is an opportunistic breach stemming from the debtor's desire
to siphon off the payment flow on the loan for another purpose. In
contrast, distress default describes a default following an
unanticipated shortage of resources due to an external shock or other
misfortune. Distress defaults are more excusable than strategic
defaults. 33 To the extent either is costly, default entails welfare losses
for the debtor and its economy. Despite this, an increase in default
costs can be efficient if it encourages lending by discouraging strategic
defaults. 34
29. Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation, and
Readjustment During the Interwar Years, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 12, 27-29 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989).
30. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim:
Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1088, 1088 (1988).
31. Gabrielle Lipworth & Jens Nystedt, Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation,
IMF STAFF PAPERS, SPECIAL ISSUE: IMF ANNUAL RES. CONF., Vol. 47, 2001 at 188, 192, 195.
32. Id. at 195.
33. The notion of excusable versus non-excusable defaults is modeled in Grossman & Van
Huyck, supra note 30.
34. Contrariwise, if a decrease in the cost of default is welfare maximizing, default is too
expensive. Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 199.
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Within this framework, economists debate two explanations of
sovereign debt: a reputation theory and an enforcement theory. There
is evidence to support both.
1. Reputation Theory
The dominant view is that the primary cost of default to the
sovereign is exclusion from future borrowing. Assume that national
economies are cyclical and that people prefer to consume evenly across
the cycles. It makes sense for the state to borrow on the downward
cycle to fund consumption and repay the loans with returns generated
on the upward cycle. The cost of default on the upward cycle is the cost
of being shut out of the credit markets and associated consumption
constraints on the next downward cycle. If default means an embargo
on future finance, the sovereign preferring smooth consumption pays
its loan. The only state that repudiates its debt is the state that never
plans to borrow again.3 5
More generally, whether in strategic or distress default, the
defaulting sovereign converts a gain to itself. Default triggers a lender
embargo. The debtor ends the embargo by transferring the converted
surplus to the lenders. So long as this recompense is made, the
moratorium can be short.36
If we assume that the debtor has a high-powered incentive to
regain access to the credit market, then the lender's problem lies less
with the default itself than with the possibility of opportunistic
behavior on the part of other lenders. A lender with no exposure to the
defaulted debt could break ranks with the unpaid lenders, ignore the
moratorium, and make a new loan to the defaulting sovereign. To the
extent a new source of credit is available, the sovereign's incentive to
35. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289, 289-90 (1981). More elaborate articulations of this
reputational model open up the class of defaults to distinguish between strategic and distress
situations and expand the lenders' behavior pattern to allow for the possibility of forgiveness. A
strategic defaulter that turns out to need future credit is "myopic." When it sees its mistake, it
becomes "nonmyopic." It signals its transformation by repaying the defaulted loans.
Readmission to the credit markets follows. Harold L. Cole et al., Default, Settlement, and
Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT'L ECON. REV.
365 (1995); see also Tomz, supra note 21, at 18-21 (describing how sovereign lenders who default
can reenter the lending markets by incurring the high cost signal of repaying their earlier debts
and showing themselves to no longer be "lemons").
36. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28, at 621. The credit inflows to Latin America in the
early 1990s in the wake of Brady restructurings provide a good example of this. CHARLES W.
CALOMIRIs, HOW TO RESOLVE THE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub.
Pol'y Research, Papers and Studies, 2001), at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.14869/
pub-detail.asp.
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reach a composition with its unpaid lenders diminishes. Ironically, the
reputational mechanism returns to working order only if the original
lenders persuade the sovereign borrower to cheat the interloping
lender.3 7 With the interloper thrown into the composition process with
the other unpaid lenders, the stick of refusal-to-lend held by the
lenders once more becomes a cost to the sovereign borrower. 38
2. Enforcement Theory
The contrasting model is built around indirect sanctions. The
theory is that a sovereign might rationally repudiate its debts even
though it still needs a future source of finance to smooth consumption
in downward cycles. The model depicts a sovereign at the end of an
upward cycle. It possesses a cache of capital with which to pay the
debt incurred on the previous downward cycle. The model suggests
that the solvent sovereign has a choice. It can either pay the debt or it
can default and invest the capital in an insurance contract designed to
protect it against the next downturn. When this investment
opportunity is available, the rational sovereign will default because, in
the long run, saving and investing has a higher return than borrowing
and repaying. When saving and investment of the purloined capital
accompany the default, the sovereign grows faster, increasing its
consumption with every turn of the cycle. 39 It follows that sovereign
debt cannot be sustained on pure reputational enforcement. The
lender must have some additional means by which to inflict financial
costs on the defaulter.40
But is the enforcement model "robust to institutional detail?"41
Its authors admit that sovereigns in default leave no obvious assets in
plain view abroad for fear of creditor attachment. They argue,
however, that this exercise of international creditor evasion carries
37. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28, at 622.
38. The importance of creditor coordination in order to discipline mavericks who were
tempted to lend to the sovereign in default during the mid-19th century is described in two recent
papers. See Mark L.J. Wright, Reputations and Sovereign Debt (Sept. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors); Mark L.J. Wright, Sovereign Risk and Creditor Coordination
(May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
39. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State
Debts in the 1840s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 267 (1996). If the debtor has no place in which to
invest, the reputational concern causes it to honor the debt. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe,
The Role of Institutions in Reputation Models of Sovereign Debt, 33 J. MONETARY ECON. 45, 47
(1995).
40. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 26, at 158; Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign
Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 46-47 (1989).
41. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 40, at 43.
2004]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
indirect costs. With the sovereign in default, foreign trade must be
conducted in roundabout ways. For example, the sovereign loses
access to short-term trade credits like bankers' acceptances, and when
the sovereign places an asset abroad, a costly dummy entity must be
used. Even if the costs of evasion are small in relation to GNP, the
costs still loom large enough in comparison to the defaulted interest to
make repudiation inconvenient: According to the model's proponents,
even if the costs of default do not exceed 5 percent of total trade, few
countries show a net gain on debt repudiation.42 Opponents, however,
argue recent debt crises have yielded little evidence of lender
interference with the trade of defaulters. 43 Moreover, it is not clear
why the lenders would want to interfere with the trade of defaulting
debtors, especially in distress defaults. Choking the debtor's trade only
prolongs the distress and further delays the payment stream.
Historians have found evidence to support both theses.44
3. Implications for Sovereign Debt Restructuring
There is enough evidence in favor of each model to suggest that
both figure into the real world dynamics of sovereign debt. Indeed, the
situation is dynamic and recent litigation developments could create
new opportunities for bondholder enforcement. 45 Below, we note some
differences in the normative implications of the two models. 46
On a reputational model, the law has a limited contribution to
make in solving sovereign debt crises. The defaulting sovereign has an
incentive to present a plan of composition and lobby creditors for
approval. Creditors themselves define the "best interest of creditors"
as they approve or reject the sovereign's offer. The cost of default
derives from the sovereign's long-term interest in credit market
42. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 26, at 158-59, 167, 174-75.
43. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28, at 622; see also Tomz, supra note 21.
44. Compare English, supra note 39 (arguing that defaults of American states during the
1840s support the reputational model), with James Conklin, The Theory of Sovereign Debt and
Spain Under Philip II, 106 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1998) (arguing that the history of the 16th century
relationship between the Genoese bankers and the Spanish crown supports the enforcement
model).
45. See infra notes 109, 111.
46. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer note a difference in the models' bearing on the current crisis in
KENNETH ROGOFF & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, EARLY IDEAS ON SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTcY
REORGANIZATION: A SURVEY (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/57, 2002). They assert
that under a reputational model the introduction of a bankruptcy regime will only have the
minor effect of causing some loss of reputation to the sovereign choosing to invoke it. Under an
enforcement model, in contrast, it is clear that the structure of the bankruptcy process matters a
great deal.
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access, not from a legally established enforcement structure. Legal
intervention thus must be justified by reference to frictions, such as
coordination problems, that create barriers to otherwise beneficial
compositions
On an enforcement model, in contrast, the cost of default varies
with the enforcement device's effectiveness. Costs of default could be
too high (greater debtor welfare loss than needed for the given
measure of creditor protection) or too low (default cost insufficient to
import an incentive to perform). Coordination problems figure here
too, but in a more complicated way. There is again a concern about
transaction costs standing in the way of agreement. But these
transaction costs can play a beneficial role as well. Assume that the
costs of default stemming from a trade disruption or a credit
moratorium are too low, and that additional costs would have the
effect of deterring strategic defaults. On this scenario, a creditor
coordination problem that delays composition and extends the period
of economic punishment could be efficiency enhancing.
We note a point of ambiguity. Some economists assert that
although strategic defaults are a theoretical possibility, sovereigns as
a practical matter only default under identifiably bad economic
conditions. 47 If true, it follows that the costs of default, whether due to
reputation or enforcement, are sufficient to import incentives to
perform. Indeed, defaults might cost too much.48 Other economists
assume that either strategic default or distress default is an active
possibility.49  If strategic defaults are possible, then the costs of
default arguably are too low. The choice between the two descriptions
is further complicated by the fact that no bright line test lets us assign
real world defaults to the strategic and distress categories. 50 Recall
that even in a situation of manifest distress due to an external shock,
the ratio of debt to GNP can remain low enough to leave the sovereign
with the ability to pay. What looks like a "distress default" may
therefore follow from a political choice among costly courses of action.
So long as the sovereign has a choice as to whether or not to default,
strategy inheres in the fact pattern. 51
47. Grossman & Van Huyck, supra note 30, at 1088.
48. For an expansion on this point of view, see INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, 8.
49. See, e.g., Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 193.
50. This difficulty has concrete policy implications. IMF planners, for example, are having
difficulty outlining terms for the activation of its sovereign bankruptcy procedure. See INT'L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, 84-92.
51. The foregoing analysis implies a debt ceiling for each sovereign. The greater the
borrowed amount the greater the benefit of default and the more likely default is signaled by the
borrower's cost-benefit analysis. The total debt load should not approach that level. Eaton &
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D. The Composition Bargain
Whatever a default's etiology, and whether our account focuses
on reputation, enforcement, or both, a question arises: Why do unpaid
creditors agree to take less than they were promised, instead of
waiting out the distress and insisting that the renewed debtor make
them whole?
For a simple scenario in which the debtor plausibly can
negotiate for a reduction in the interest rate or the principal amount
(a "haircut"), assume an enforcement model. Assume also that the
lenders have a costly punishment available. Deployment of the
punishment is cost effective for the lenders but the expected yield is
less than the principal and interest owed. The borrower can come to
the table with an offer of compensation in exchange for the
withholding of the sanction. So long as the borrower offers more than
the creditors' expected return from the sanction, they will settle for
less than originally promised.52 Further, the creditors cannot credibly
commit in advance to refuse to renegotiate. 53
Now switch to a reputational model. The sovereign's overhang
of unpaid loans could discourage new investment. If the forgiveness of
some of the debt restores the incentive to invest, it can be in the
incumbent creditors' interest to make a concession. The new
investment benefits the sovereign's economy, while also making the
debt worth more than it would have been worth without the
concessions and the new investment.54 This is called "the debt Laffer
Curve," because forgiving part of the debt increases the prospects for
repayment of the remaining obligation. 55
Compositions can occur prior to default as well as in the wake
of default. When a debtor with a current payment record experiences
liquidity problems, a composition can be the means to avert default.
The objective will be to delay near term maturities, stretching out the
Gersovitz, supra note 35, at 289. The debt ceiling will rise, however, as the creditors'
enforcement devices make default more costly for the debtor.
52. Jonathan Eaton, Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts, 4 J.
ECON. PERSP. 43, 50-51 (1990).
53. Conklin, supra note 44, at 493-94. A proposed program of IMF funding conditioned on
creditor concessions would work similarly.
54. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405-06 (1981).
55. Kenneth Rogoff, Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Country Debt, 4 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1990). Some question this explanation: with this free lunch sitting on the
table, one can ask why debt crises take so long to resolve. Creditor coordination problems may be
the reason. For an argument against the Laffer Curve in respect to Latin American borrowers in
the 1980s, see Eaton, supra note 52, at 46-48.
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payment schedule and reducing the near term interest burden. There
will be a basis for trade with the creditors if, due to the liquidity crisis,
the debt is trading at a substantial discount on expectations that
payment in full will not be forthcoming. The composition relieves the
near-term payment burden and averts the risk of default. This creates
value because default carries collateral costs for both the creditors and
debtor.56 Pakistan, Ecuador and Ukraine all successfully negotiated
exchanges along these lines in the late 1990s. In the latter two cases,
the price of their bonds went up 20 to 30 percent.57 Argentina and
Turkey followed the same model in 2001.68
Ideally, a distressed sovereign restructures prior to default.
Avoiding default enhances the sovereign's reputation in the credit
markets and economizes on enforcement costs. Unfortunately,
liquidity crises often move more quickly than the adjustment
processes and default proves unavoidable.
Multiple factors come to bear on the composition bargain,
whether concluded before or after default. Clearly, adequate
information respecting the debtor's economy, financial condition, and
future prospects are necessary for the creditors to effectively appraise
an offer on the table. The debtor comes to the table with some
bargaining power. Because money has a time value and the future
state of the debtor's economy remains uncertain, a deal promising the
resumption of payments after default can be attractive. Institutional
concerns also can incline creditors toward acceptance. On the other
hand, waiting has an option value. Any offer simply holding out an
increase in the price of bonds will not necessarily garner support.
Sweeteners may have to be added; for example, an increased interest
rate on the restructured debt to compensate for a repayment
deferral. 59 And even with a sweetener added, creditor coordination
problems can sour the deal.
56. Among other things, the debtor that defaults on one issue will suffer an inability to
borrow, cross defaults on all of its bonds, loss of control of the process of restructuring, capital
outflows, and a general loss of confidence in its economy. All of this negatively impacts the price
of the bonds as well. Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 200.
57. Id. Such dramatic increases may not occur again. The market, worried about hold outs,
was skeptical about the possibility that the exchange offers could succeed. Henceforth, prices of
bonds of sovereigns in impending distress will reflect the possibility of successful composition
prior to the exhaustion of liquidity. Id. at 206.
58. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Financial Crises and What To Do About Them 55, 63-64
(2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
59. Id. at 57.
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E. Coordination Problems and Coercive Behavior
Creditor coordination problems erect barriers to successful
compositions. To describe them, we take up the particulars of today's
sovereign debt crisis.
Today's crisis holds out coordination problems more daunting
than those encountered during the 1980s. In the 1980s crisis,
unanimous assent to compositions at least was feasible because money
center banks held the bulk of the debt outstanding. Bank lenders are
repeat players, constrained to cooperate with one another.60 But the
cast of characters changed in the 1990s. The banks sustained
significant losses in the Latin American crises of the 1980s, and
withdrew from a dominant role in sovereign lending. The sovereigns,
returning to the borrowing practices of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, turned to the bond markets. The shift meant
larger numbers of creditors holding smaller claims. In mid-1999, for
example, Argentina had $111.8 billion of foreign issued bonds
outstanding and $29.6 billion of bank loans.61 The bondholders were
spread all over the world. Many were institutional investors, but there
also were also large numbers of small, individual investors-
purchasers of bonds in retail "cookie jar" offerings in Germany and
Japan. 62 Such a heterogeneous group of creditors inevitably can be
expected to hold heterogeneous views about the debtor's ability to
pay.63
Obtaining the consent of a multitude of creditors is partly a
matter of incurring costs (and retaining an underwriter and a proxy
solicitor). But there also is a barrier in the contracts themselves. Of
Argentina's $111.8 billion of foreign bonds, 89 percent were issued
60. For a description of the workouts of the 1980s, see Jessica W. Miller, Comment, Solving
the Latin American Sovereign Debt Crisis, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 677, 679-89 (2001).
61. Pablo E. Guidotti, On Debt Management and Collective Action Clauses, in REFORMING
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 265, 271 tbl.1 (Peter B. Kenen &
Alexander K. Swoboda eds., 1999), available at http://www.utdt.edul-pguidottil
on.debt. management.and.collective. action.clauses.pdf.
62. The shift in emerging market sovereign debt towards bonds is detailed in Mark L. J.
Wright, Sovereign Risk and Creditor Coordination (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors). See also Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market
and Its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701 (1996).
63. For this reason, it makes no sense for a debtor to take the cash it has reserved for
principal payments on defaulted debt and repurchase the debt on the market at deeply
discounted prices. Once the market sees the buying activity, the price will rise to the reservation
of price of the creditor with the highest valuation. Ishac Diwan & Dani Rodrik, External Debt,
Adjustment, and Burden Sharing. A Unified Framework, PRINCETON STUD. INT'L FIN. NO. 73, at
35-36 (1992).
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pursuant to debt contracts containing unanimous action clauses.64
These UACs are customary in bonds issued in the United States,
Germany, and Japan.65 The remaining 11 percent of Argentina's
bonds were issued in London, where the drafting practice includes
collective action clauses. UACs invite free riding: Because the
transaction makes the group as a whole better off, an opportunistic
bondholder has an incentive to "hold out"-to withhold her vote in
hopes of procuring a side payment. 66
UACs do not present an absolute bar to debt restructuring,
however. A composition can be effected by indirection. Instead of being
asked to vote on an amendment to their bond contracts, the
bondholders are asked to exchange their bonds for substitute bonds
that contain modified terms more favorable to the debtor. The
proponent of the substitute bonds neither expects nor requests
universal participation. Even so, the exchange offer does not close
unless it garners supermajority acceptance. Holdouts remain a
problem, however, because a free riding strategy remains available to
the bondholder opportunist even if no side payments are forthcoming.
To say no to an exchange offer is to hold on to your bond. You thereby
retain the debtor's original promise to pay and all other contract
rights, even as the exchanging majority makes concessions. If the offer
succeeds, you benefit from the economic recovery, like the creditors
who exchanged their bonds, without having made any concessions.
Institutional bondholders known as "vulture funds" specialize in such
strategic behavior. They typically purchase their bonds on the
64. Guidotti, supra note 61, at 271 & tbl.1.
65. The majority of sovereign bonds choose New York law; these include both bonds issued
in New York and Eurobond issues. See, e.g., Peter Petas & Rashique Rahman, Sovereign Bonds-
Legal Aspects that Affect Default and Recovery, GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS, May 1999, at 59,
60 (finding that over 70 percent of sovereign Eurobonds are issued under New York law).
66. These UACs can also be described as IACs, or Individual Action Clauses, because they
grant bondholders individual rights. See generally Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds:
The Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040 (2002).
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secondary market after the onset of distress at a deep discount, 67
looking for short-term returns of up to 30 percent.68
If only a few creditors hold out, the exchange offer still
succeeds. Unfortunately, if enough creditors hold out, the exchange
offer will fail. More particularly, if the subsidy to the holdouts is
greater than the increase in value to the exchanging creditors, every
one of them is better off by refusing to exchange. 69 The failure of the
offer then makes everybody worse off. Generally, in corporate
exchange offers, it takes supermajority participation in the exchange
offer-something more than 90 percent-to minimize the siphoning of
value to the holdouts and therefore permit the offer to succeed.70
The process can be manipulated for the borrower's benefit as
well. Suppose a debtor owes $100 and claims to have the resources to
support a payment of only $50. Assume it makes a take-it-or-leave-it
exchange offer-a substitute debt contract with a face amount 50
percent lower than the original contract. The creditors believe the
debtor can pay $70 and refuse to exchange, so the debtor tries again,
this time making the new debt offer senior to the debt in default. On
an enforcement model of sovereign debt, the creditors now accept the
offer, because failing to do so leaves them with a claim for $100
against an asset base that certainly will be less than $50. 7 1
Alternatively, the sovereign could have the new debt secured by a
payment stream at its disposal. The addition of seniority or security in
the new issue imports an element of coercion.
Note that if the debtor makes a coercive offer considered too
low by substantial number of creditors, the holdout possibility benefits
the group as whole. 72 On the other hand, covenants in standard
67. The term "vulture" refers to the fact that these hedge funds typically purchase the debt
of companies and countries that are in financial distress and, therefore, have debt that is trading
at a deep discount. Although even the Institute of International Finance-the global association
of financial institutions-has publicly called for a targeted legal strategy to counter the
supposedly disruptive activities of vulture funds in the context of sovereign restructurings, these
funds are not without their supporters. See Vulture Hunt, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at 20
(arguing that vulture funds serve to provide much needed liquidity in the markets for distressed
sovereign debt), 2002 WL 20298184; John Dizard, A Bankrupt Solution to Sovereign Debt, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at 24 (arguing that there is nothing problematic about a vulture fund that
purchases sovereign debt at a deep discount and then sues to be paid in full), 2002 WL 3303702.
68. John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1214
(1991).
69. Roe, supra note 6, at 236.
70. Coffee & Klein, supra note 68, at 1207-14.
71. Calvo, supra note 9, at 13.
72. Coffee & Klein, supra note 68, at 1223.
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sovereign debt contracts ("negative pledge" and "pari passu" clauses)
can be read to make the foregoing ploys ineffective by giving the non-
exchanging creditors a pro rata right to the payment stream of the
new bonds. 73 If the creditors can sustain this interpretation, they can
attach the payments on the new bonds, and the coercive exchange
does not proceed.
Finally, sovereign debt contracts hand the borrower a weapon
to use against holdouts: the "exit consent." The exchange offer is
combined with amendment of terms in the bond contract that protect
the bondholders but are subject to majority amendment. Under the
New York practice, payment terms are subject to UACs while
ancillary promises and process terms that protect the bondholders are
subject to CACs. As they exit, the cooperative, exchanging
bondholders approve an amendment that lifts the contract protections
of the holdouts. This leaves the holdouts with their original principal
and interest terms intact, but subject to manipulative action by the
debtor. For example, the pari passu and negative pledge clauses
described above may disappear through the exit consent process. For
the holdouts, the possibility of ever receiving full payment diminishes
with the loss of these protective provisions. 74 Within the past few
years, exit consents have been used successfully by both Ecuador and
Uruguay. 75
F. The Best Interest of Sovereign Creditors
Summarizing the foregoing economics and contracting practice,
we now describe the best interest of creditors.
73. The use of pari passu and negative pledge provisions in this context-that is, where the
sovereign attempts to grant a new borrower senior rank or security in the form of an earmarking
of a specific payment stream for it-is very different than a vulture creditor trying to block
payments to others of equivalent rank who have proceeded with a restructuring. That latter
tactic, which appeared for the first time in the Elliott suit against Peru in Brussels in 2000,
depends on a questionable interpretation of the pari passu clause that most commentators
consider to be incorrect. See infra note 102. The legal validity of that interpretation is beyond the
scope of this article.
74. On the use of exit consents to engineer a sovereign restructuring, see Lee C. Buchheit &
G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 70-82 (2000).
See also Michael M. Chamberlin, At the Frontier of Exit Consents, Remarks at the Bear Stearns
and EMCA Sovereign Creditors Rights Conference (Nov. 8, 2001), http://www.emta.org!
ndevelop/exitcons.pdf.
75. See Felix Salmon, Calm After the Storm, EUROMONEY, May 2003, at 100, 103; Felix
Salmon & Jorge Gallargo, The Buy Side Starts to Bite Back, EUROMONEY, Apr. 2001, at 46, 58-
59; Uruguay: Exchange Could Ease Liquidity Problem, but Fiscal Adjustments Remain Key to
Restoring Solvency, EMERGING MARKETS RES. NEWSL. (J.P. Morgan, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 30,
2003, at 1.
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On a reputation model, default amounts to a standstill that
endures until the sovereign (a) emerges from distress, and (b)
determines that the benefits of renewed access to credit outweigh the
costs of making payments on the old debt. Agreement on a composition
can hasten reentry because scaling down the amount of old debt
increases the sovereign's borrowing capacity. When the sovereign has
a source of new borrowing to use in restoring its economic health, the
incumbent creditors have an additional reason to agree to take less.
But the floor on concessions is determined by the payoffs. If a debtor
demanded deep concessions but the creditors projected an anemic
economic recovery, then the creditors would likely reject the debtor's
demands.
In contrast, when the market value of the debt after the
composition is greater than the market value prior, the debtor and
creditor will bargain over a surplus. The allocation of the surplus
between the debtor and the creditors depends on a number of
variables, including information asymmetries and economic volatility.
But, at the bottom line, the sovereign must cater to the creditors, since
it pays them only for the purpose of returning to their good graces.
Now shift to an enforcement model of sovereign debt. This
changes the variables but delivers us to the same negotiating table.
The borrower comes to the table because the default imposes costs on
foreign trade; costs that make it harder to get out of distress. These
costs of default do not redound to the creditors' immediate benefit,
however, even as they have to invest in enforcement initiatives. Their
unpaid bonds trade at discounts as a result. The double negative-
costs on both the borrower and lender sides--creates room for trade.
These descriptions reveal a lot about the best interest of
creditors without suggesting that a bankruptcy regime would enhance
creditor welfare. This is because the models are populated by rational
actors and outcomes follow from the presence or absence of a surplus.
Given a surplus, the parties figure out a way to divide it, but given no
surplus, there is no deal and the creditors are better off waiting.
Within this framework, a bankruptcy system can be justified
three ways. First, it may help bring a surplus into existence. This
would be the case where unilateral creditor enforcement actions
prevented sovereign recovery without benefiting the creditors as a
whole. This also would be the case if the IMF and other official sector
actors decided that bankruptcy advanced their own purposes and
made submission to the constraints of a bankruptcy system a
condition to financial relief programs. Relief in the form of new
lending can contribute to the creation of a surplus, justifying the
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bankruptcy regime. Second, a bankruptcy regime may prevent a
surplus from being dissipated. This would be the case if enforcement
actions by creditors occurred frequently, causing costs of disruption to
outweigh the benefits to the creditors as a whole. Third, a bankruptcy
regime may overcome process frictions. Coordination problems could
make it hard for sovereigns to get the composition proposal a full
hearing. Even if compositions could be concluded without a formal
bankruptcy regime, a legally constituted and protected space for
renegotiation could, in theory, facilitate a debtor-creditor accord. By
helping the creditors cheaply determine their best interest, it could
make everyohie better off. Alternatively, the dispersed creditors could
have a collective action problem. The sovereign might exploit this by
making a short duration take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer designed to
allocate the majority of the surplus to itself. Finally, given debt
contracts containing UACs (and perhaps even with CAC contracts),
creditor opportunism in the form of holding out could prevent an
otherwise advantageous composition from garnering sufficient assent.
There is a distinction among the three justifications for
sovereign bankruptcy. The first and second justifications address the
maximization of a surplus, in both cases triggered by value-depressive
enforcement opportunities. Under a reputational model, neither
justification is available. The third justification, with its focus on
process and coercion, applies to both models of sovereign debt. To the
extent that the reputational model has the greater resonance in real
world practice, as we think has been the case up to now, the third
justification should shape the bankruptcy regime. On this theory,
sovereign bankruptcy should focus on solving creditor coordination
problems and protecting against debtor overreaching in the division of
the surplus rather than on containing creditor enforcement.
The best interest of creditors will vary with the circumstances.
Where the sovereign is poised to recover, the best interest is a
contractual arrangement that both restores the flow of payments and
restores the sovereign to good standing as a borrower. Other
compositions look toward rehabilitation at a future date. Here the best
interest lies in a composition that divides the surplus in a satisfactory
way, assuming the creditors deem the surplus to be adequate.
Whatever the situation, the composition that realizes the best interest
of creditors will follow from creditor assent. The goal of any sovereign
restructuring mechanism, therefore, should be to enable freely given
creditor assent.
20041
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
III. TOWARD MINIMAL BANKRUPTCY
A. The Possible Regimes and the State of the Policy Debate
In Part III, we use the economic principles explained in Part II
to explain why the first of the two major reform proposals, that of the
IMF, has failed to win support from either the creditors or sovereign
borrowers. We begin by setting out the range of proposals and the
current state of the debate.
Sovereign bankruptcy discussions contemplate four alternative
states of the world:
(1) Full Bankruptcy. This regime would be modeled on Chapter
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, but adjusted for the
differences between the private and sovereign debt contexts.7 6 Such a
regime would have four basic features. It would: (a) stay enforcement
proceedings by creditors; (b) accord priority status to new debt
financing extended during the bankruptcy proceeding; (c) provide for
approval of a composition by a supermajority of creditors, trumping
contracts with UACs; and (d) empower a judicial authority to cram
down a composition on dissenting creditors and classes, provided the
composition met a substantive standard, in cases in which the
supermajority approval was not met but a lower approval threshold
was satisfied.77
(2) Minimal Bankruptcy. This regime would eliminate any or
all of three elements of full bankruptcy: the stay, the priority for new
credit, and the cram down. 78 Approval of the composition would
76. For a summary of the differences between them, see Tarullo, supra note 9, at 633-35.
For an expanded comparative perspective, see Patrick Bolton, Towards a Statutory Approach to
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World
(Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
77. For full bankruptcy proposals, see Benjamin J. Cohen, Developing-Country Debt: A
Middle Way, ESSAYS INT'L FIN. No. 173 (1989). See generally Kunibert Raffer, Applying Chapter
9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with a Human Face, 18
WORLD DEV. 301 (1990) (drawing insights from Chapter 9, the United States bankruptcy system
for municipalities).
78. For an academic proposal in the minimal bankruptcy mode, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956,
980-1010 (2000). For variations on the theme in policy briefs, see Anne Krueger, New
Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Speech at the
Institute for International Economics Conference on "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and
Hazards" (Apr. 1, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm; INT'L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, 6-14. See also Christopher G. Oechsli, Procedural Guidelines
for Renegotiating LDC Debts: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21
VA. J. INT'L L. 305 (1981); Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of the Last Right?,
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proceed under statutory rules, UACs would be superseded, and
dissenters would be bound. There would be little incentive to hold out,
unless a creditor had enough votes to block a majority.
(3) Universal Collective Action Clauses. All sovereign bonds
would have CACs. No international bankruptcy regime would come
into existence. 79
(4) Status Quo. Market actors would continue to exercise
unfettered discretion in their contract drafting.8 0
The cutting edge of the policy debate lies between regimes (2)
and (3) above. Meanwhile, sovereign issuers and bondholders reject
regime (2) and frequently express a preference for regime (4), but have
taken steps towards regime (3).81
The case for a bankruptcy mandate took a step forward when
Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, endorsed
the idea in November 2001.82 Her proposal was criticized by
sovereigns and their bondholders alike for giving the IMF too much
control over future compositions. The IMF then went back to the
drawing board, reemerging on April 1, 2002, when Krueger laid out a
more detailed proposal. The IMF made an emphatic move towards
minimalism, offering a scheme featuring more creditor involvement
and less IMF control.8 3
The IMF's proposal has become the salient statement of the
minimal bankruptcy idea. Krueger argues that an international
bankruptcy regime needs to perform five functions: The procedure
must provide (1) for confirmation by a supermajority vote of creditors,
voting as one class across the range of the sovereign's debt
instruments; (2) for a stay of enforcement proceedings against the
debtor; (3) for priority status (and exclusion from the stay) for credit
extended to the debtor after commencement; (4) for a standstill of
debtor payments to creditors other than those extending new credit;
Graham Lecture at Princeton University (Apr. 20, 1995) (on file with authors). For a review of
the literature, see ROGOFF & ZETPTELMEYER, supra note 46.
79. See Taylor, supra note 11.
80. In the economist's ideal world version of the status quo, there would be no more bail
outs and, therefore, no moral hazard problems.
81. Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
May 2003, at 19, 20-21; Dealing with Default, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at 63, 64.
82. Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at the National Economists Club Annual Members
Dinner (Nov. 26, 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm [hereinafter
Krueger, IFA: A New Approach]; see also ANNE KRUEGER, INT'L MONETARY FUND, A NEW
APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/exrp/sdrmleng/sdrm.pdf [hereinafter KRUEGER, A NEW APPROACH].
83. See Krueger, supra note 78.
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and (5) for reform of the debtor's economic policies. 8 4 The procedure
would vest gatekeeper authority in the IMF. A distressed sovereign
debtor would apply to the IMF for a standstill. The IMF would grant
the standstill only if the debtor is acting in "good faith" and is
committed to adjusting its debts.8 5 Negotiation between the debtor,
the preexisting creditors, and the IMF would then proceed inside the
bankruptcy framework. A limited adjudicatory authority would be
created that would not pass judgment on the substance of the plan,
but would resolve disputes within the group of creditors.
The contract versus mandate debate was joined on April 2,
2002, when John Taylor, Undersecretary to the United States
Treasury, refused to endorse the IMF proposal, asserting that contract
reform remained the preferred mode for addressing the problem of
sovereign default.8 6 If UACs were a problem, then the bondholders
themselves ought to be willing to trade in their old bonds for
substitutes containing CACs. With the exchanges effected, debt could
be restructured without the need for a bankruptcy process.87
The bankruptcy movement has paused while actors variously
appraise the IMF proposal and the viability of the contractual
alternative. The IMF itself professes to be considering the contractual
alternative.88 Indeed, internal IMF discussions respecting the design
of a sovereign bankruptcy regime have been gravitating away from
mandate and in the direction of creditor consent.8 9 On another front,
actors working under G-10 auspices have devised new CACs adequate
to the task assigned by the Treasury. 90 Success for the contractual
solution, however, depends on the voluntary participation of sovereign
borrowers and lenders, and a significant segment of that community is
skeptical.91 The Treasury, apparently annoyed by the bondholders'
84. See KRUEGER, A NEW APPROACH, supra note 82.
85. Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 11; Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82.
86. See Taylor, supra note 11.
87. Id.
88. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Board Discusses Possible Features at a
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Jan. 7, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pn12003/pn0306.htm.
89. See generally INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8.
90. See GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES,
annex 1 (2002), http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.
91. For early reports on the wariness of market participants about the various reform
proposals, see Alan Beattie, Financial Groupings Want New Debt Rules, FIN. TIMES, June 12,
2002, at 12, 12 (reporting agreement among buyers and sellers on the sovereign bond markets
over unattractiveness of the IMF's statutory reform proposal); James Tyson, European Nations
Plan to Issue Sovereign Bonds with New Clauses, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 9, 2002 (reporting
that while Germany, France, and thirteen other European countries are willing to introduce
[Vol. 57:1
SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM
failure to embrace its contractarian accommodation of their interests,
responded with a public tilt in the direction of the IMF proposal. 92
This leaves the Treasury and the IMF occupying common ground,
simultaneously (and ambiguously) entertaining the possibility of both
approaches. Even so, the Treasury's message to the bondholders
seems clear enough: Get with our contractarian program or face
something you will like even less. These informal pressure tactics
have yielded dividends, as Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa, and
a half dozen other countries have begun experiments with CACs in
their New York bonds. 93
We appraise the IMF proposal here, deferring our appraisal of
the Treasury's proposal to Part IV. Section B argues that the IMF
proposal is not minimal enough. This discussion draws on Part II's
presentation of the incentive structure of sovereign lending
relationships to assert that three of the proposal's features-the stay
of enforcement, the grant of priority status for new loans, and the
payment standstill-add little to the posture of a sovereign default
under the status quo. The value that the IMF proposal adds,
therefore, differs little from the contractual proposal. Both seek
majoritarian voting with the goal of facilitating bargaining and
rehabilitation. The difference lies in the means to the end-where the
Treasury would contract into CACs, the IMF would mandate them.
Section C expands on our argument for minimal bankruptcy by
explaining why the IMF proposal appropriately omits two central
features of the United States bankruptcy system-judicial fairness
review of the reorganization plan and judicial cram down.
CACs, the Group of 24-including India and Egypt-have rejected the idea of CACs). The initial
news on the proposals was not all bad though. Gradually, a critical mass of market actors came
to support the inclusion of CACs in new issues. Whitney Debevoise, The Debt Crisis Debate,
LATIN FIN., Nov. 2002, at 52-54, http://www.emta.org/keyper/partingshotfinall.pdf; see New
Option Arises for Future Bond Launch, GERTA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2002 (reporting
Brazil's announced willingness to introduce CACs).
92. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard, Enhancing Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at IMF
Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms (Jan. 22, 2003) (Chairman of Council
of Economic Advisers espousing contractarian approach while simultaneously endorsing the
benefits of an organized restructuring process).
93. John Barham, Cooking Up a New Solution, LATIN FIN., June 2003, at 10. As of the date
of this writing, the list also included Canada, Turkey, Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela,
and Korea. The exception to this trend was Israel, which used UACs in its New York law
registration. For a recent report on this front, see INT'L MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION (2003),
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/pdr/cr/2OO3/eng/O90503.pdf.
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B. Not Minimal Enough
Krueger describes the IMF proposal in terms of the creditors'
best interests. She professes three objectives: (1) providing incentives
for more orderly and timely restructuring; (2) protecting asset values
and creditors' rights; and (3) reducing the costs of disorderly
workouts.94 Many third parties, we suspect, read the proposal as an
attempt to cure the problems that the IMF encountered in the bailouts
of the mid-1990s. On this view, the best interest of creditors takes a
back seat to the IMF's immediate objectives-preventing contagion in
the international credit markets and transferring the burden of
restructuring to private creditors. 95
1. The Standstill and the Bail In
The third-party view better describes the proposal's intended
scope of operation. Consider the functions played by three of the
proposal's components-the stay of enforcement proceedings, the
standstill respecting payments, and the provision of priority for new
loans. This trio is supposed to come into operation as distress ripens to
default, encasing and ordering the process of emergency financing.
The objective is to transform the bail out into a "bail in." Here is the
scenario. First, the sovereign with a liquidity crisis goes to the IMF,
which plays a gatekeeping role, distinguishing between applicants
genuinely in crisis and applicants able to pay and seeking to use the
bankruptcy safe space opportunistically. 96 Once the gate is opened
and the sovereign enters the safe space, the liquidity crisis is eased.
Since a standstill is- in effect, no default occurs and everyone stays
calm. With no payments due immediately, an emergency loan from the
IMF need not take first place on the agenda; instead, the preexisting
creditors must come to the table and agree to give-ups. Capital
controls also may be needed at this early point, the theory being that
capital controls imposed with IMF sanction and for a short period of
time will have no perverse effects. Once the preexisting creditors take
their haircut, the IMF makes its loan from a priority position.
94. Krueger, supra note 78.
95. Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 190, ascribe a trio of objectives to the IMF: (1) see
private creditors share the burden of restructuring; (2) confine the damage of distress, protecting
the world economy; and (3) see that the international credit markets run smoothly.
96. See Krueger, supra note 78.
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Liquidity restored, the short-term bankruptcy ends. Combining the
loan and the haircut, the debtor is creditworthy once more. 97
This sounds reasonable, but questions arise about credibility
and perverse effects. The standstill is supposed to obviate the need to
avoid default with new borrowing, but, in substance, standstill and
default are the same thing. The literature points to only one point of
difference. Standstill imports a freeze on interest accruals9" where
interest continues to accrue during the period of default under the
debt contracts as written. This distinction does not impress us. That
the interest meter stops clicking due to a statutory mandate does not
make a default any less of a default. Nor does it change the final
payment outcome. In the present system, the sovereign ready to
return to the credit markets negotiates a payment schedule for less
than the full amount. Interest accruals during the default appear
primarily as numbers in the page of rights to be scaled down. Their
existence is unlikely to make a difference in the negotiation's outcome.
The standstill provision speaks more to liquid capital nervously
poised to exit the distressed jurisdiction than to the unpaid creditors.
Here the bankruptcy regime blesses the default with a legal sanction.
But it is not clear why, as between the status quo and the
hypothesized new regime, a different behavior pattern follows for
nervous capital that readily can be transferred to other national
venues. Capital controls aside, the aspect of the program most likely
to maintain calm in fluid capital markets is the prospect of an IMF
emergency credit facility. 99 But the incentive structure implicit in the
proposal does not hold out an ex ante IMF commitment. Instead, the
preexisting creditors must make their give-ups under a threat that
IMF credit will be withheld. Any doubt on this score would be resolved
by capital flight, necessitating capital controls. It is hard to see how a
standstill declaration makes a difference.
Nor is it clear that preexisting creditors will agree to a quick
haircut. In the past, creditors have been incidental beneficiaries of
IMF emergency credit. If the IMF is going to make the loans anyway,
whether for political reasons or due to concerns about the
international financial system, then bondholders are better off holding
97. The closest analogue in practice is the prepackaged bankruptcy, an out-of-court
composition closed through Chapter 11 in order to take advantage of the Chapter's majority
voting scheme. Section 1126(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000), permits an
issuer to conduct a binding vote on a plan of reorganization prior to filing for bankruptcy. In
addition, 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) allows a debtor to file a plan with its chapter 11 petition.
98. See Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 11.
99. Id. at 80-83.
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out as a group. On the other hand, in cases like those of Ecuador and
Ukraine, where default carries no negative systemic threat and
emergency credit has been withheld, the IMF has a credible
bargaining position. But the IMF has that bargaining position
whether or not the negotiation is encased in a formal bankruptcy
proceeding. Of course, the standstill stops the payment stream and
pressures the lenders, but an old fashioned default does that as well.
Moreover, the longer the standstill stays in place, the emergency
proceeding designed to avert a liquidity crisis looks more like a
conventional, drawn out sovereign default. As such, it hardly would
have the effect of restoring confidence and preventing contagion.
The IMF's transmogrification of a "default" into "standstill,"
therefore, seems unlikely to persuade either nervous capitalists or the
lending community that financial distress is not financial distress.
Capital, not recharacterization, cures distress, leaving the IMF in
more or less the same position with or without a bankruptcy process.
2. Priority Lending
At present, the IMF effectively receives priority treatment from
its members-borrowers. Unlike private sovereign lenders, the IMF
does not consent to reductions of its payment rights. And, unlike
private lenders, it almost always gets paid. 100 The IMF's priority
proposal, 101 then, merely formalizes and sanctions the present
practice, much like its standstill proposal, and would make a
difference only if used to facilitate new financing with private credit in
a manner similar to debtor-in-possession financing in corporate
bankruptcies. This use, however, creates an appearance of conflict
with one of the basic tenets of the reputation theory of sovereign debt.
Recall that once the default occurs and the lenders are waiting for
recovery, the sovereign retains a repayment incentive only to the
extent that no third party lender appears on the scene holding out a
new credit line. The IMF priority lending proposal effectuates just
that result. 10 2
In other words, the extant creditors will not always want the
distressed sovereign to have access to fresh priority lending. It follows
that the incumbent creditors will want to decide on new priority loans
100. STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 226.
101. See also INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, 72.
102. The priority lending proposal, like the CAC proposal, requires a mandate that overrides
existing sovereign debt contracts. The contracts contain "pari passu" clauses which make
priorities ineffective. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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themselves. In many cases, one would expect such consent to be
forthcoming readily, as all the creditors benefit when new financing
helps bring the sovereign's economy out of distress. 10 3 So long as the
debtor retains a good faith commitment to resuming debt service at
the earliest opportunity, a priority emergency credit function should
not prove deleterious to the interests of the creditors as a whole. But
one should not expect approval in all cases. New priority loans hold
out risks to preexisting creditors. If the loan proceeds are badly
managed and the new capital does not assist the recovery process, but
instead, say, flows out of the country, then a priority credit facility
worsens the position of preexisting creditors.
We question whether IMF assumption of authority to decide on
new priority private lending should be included in a sovereign
bankruptcy regime. It does not serve the purpose of solving a collective
action problem. Of course, new financing could hasten the sovereign's
economic recovery. But the IMF's proposal merely shifts authority
from the creditors: Bond contracts already allow for the preexisting
creditors to permit fresh priority lending with a vote of either a simple
majority or two-thirds majority of the bonds.10 4  Since the IMF's
agenda often diverges from that of the creditors, this shift of authority
respecting priority private credit to the IMF would not be in the best
interest of the creditors. 10 5
3. The Stay
The IMF, still following the corporate template, includes a stay
of enforcement in its sovereign bankruptcy proposal.10 6 In the private
context, the stay is essential. Direct creditor enforcement against
going concern assets tends to be value destructive, and the whole
purpose of corporate reorganization is the enhancement of going
concern value. It is less clear what benefits redound from a stay in the
sovereign context. At least one commentary suggests that it should be
dispensed with. 10 7 We agree, even as we note that the matter remains
arguable.
103. For a statement of the importance of new priority financing in respect of sovereign
recovery, see Bolton, supra note 76.
104. For an explication, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the
Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1345-46 (2002).
105. This position recently has garnered support within the IMF. See INT'L MONETARY FUND,
supra note 8, 169-77 (proposing that new priority private loans require approval of 75 percent
of the preexisting creditors).
106. Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82.
107. Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 984-85.
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Direct enforcement of sovereign debt is the exception and not
the rule. Even the enforcement model of sovereign debt claims only
that creditors use indirect means to inflict costs on defaulting
sovereigns. We suspect the stay has found its way into the IMF
proposal in order to address a residual threat of enforcement by
vulture funds. This came to the attention of the international financial
community as the result of an incident in June 2000.108 Peru was in
the process of executing a payment promise made pursuant to a
composition reached with its creditors. Funds intended for holders of
European issues were dispatched in banking channels. A hedge fund
that had been a holdout from the composition managed to identify, in
Belgium, monies headed to Frankfurt. The fund procured an
attachment from a Belgian judge, ruling ex parte. The legal theory
was that the payment violated a covenant of the original bond
contract, which still governed the bonds belonging to the holdout.
Whether or not the theory would have held up in a more
knowledgeable court, 109 the ploy worked. Peru caved in and paid the
vultures in full rather than have a settlement already reached with
the vast majority of its creditors disrupted by a drawn out legal
proceeding.
Since then, the threat of disruptive enforcement actions by
holdout creditors has been repeatedly offered to justify both a
sovereign bankruptcy regime and UAC reform. 1" 0 Although the threat
has been utilized effectively in at least two other instances,"' its
108. For a fuller description of the incident, see G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign
Piracy, 56 BuS. LAw. 635, 635-36 (2001). See also Eric Lindenbaum & Alicia Duran, Debt
Restructuring: Legal Considerations, EMERGING MARKETS RES. (Merrill Lynch & Co. Global
Securities Research & Economics Group, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 30, 2000, at 1-3.
109. See Gulati & Klee, supra note 108, at 636-37, 651 (arguing that the argument was
infirm); Letter from Charles H. Dallara, Managing Director, Institute of International Finance,
to the Honorable Gordon Brown, Chairman of the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (Apr. 9, 2002) (stating that the consensus of legal experts is that the interpretation of
the pari passu clause in Elliott v. Peru (Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92
(Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000)) was incorrect and suggesting a
strategy for reversing that interpretation), http://www.iif.com/data/public/icdc0402.pdf.
110. Most prominently, the actions of Elliott featured in Anne Krueger's speech on November
26, 2001 at the National Economists' Club, where she discussed the IMF's statutory proposal.
See Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82.
111. See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructuring, 54
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing both the pari passu cases) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors). The attempt to utilize the pari passu argument has also failed in one
instance. See Kensington Int'l, Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial Court,
Apr. 16, 2003), aff'd, 2003 WL 1935493 (C.A. May 13, 2003). As of this writing, the most recent
case, against Nicaragua, has yielded an initial decision for the vulture creditors and has an
appeal pending. See Angela Pruitt, Nicaragua Creditor Suit Muddles Sovereign Restructuring,
DOW JONES CAP. MARKETS REP., Sept. 29, 2003.
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gravity is questionable. Peru was jumped unawares in Belgium. It
seems unlikely that many nations making payments in respect of a
composition (or otherwise in a state of default) will be taken unawares
in the future. Payment channels can be structured so that neither the
sovereign nor its agents is the titleholder to any monies passing
through unsafe territory, to the extent that passage through unsafe
territory is necessary at all.112 Consider this in regard to actions by
Argentina in 2001, at a time of imminent default. Argentina and the
IMF worried about creditor enforcement actions in the United States,
where the Argentine government's bank reserves were sited. The
expedient was simple. The monies were transferred to the Bank for
International Settlements in Basle, 113 apparently a safe space. The
implication is that with advance planning, direct judicial enforcement
against sovereigns has limited utility. No easy sovereign analog exists
to the private law race to the courthouse.
On the contrary side, the enforcement model of sovereign debt
can be drawn on to support a stay. As enforcement proceeds indirectly
under the model, the sovereign incurs the costs of husbanding its
assets so as to frustrate direct enforcement.11 4 It follows that a stay
could assist the rehabilitation process, even if attachments are few
and far between. 115 The stay frees up the sovereign to engage in cross
border transactions without incurring the costs of subterfuge. To the
extent the enforcement model identifies costs, a stay imports benefits
to the sovereign.
Whether an appropriate balance of enforcement costs and
performance incentives would result from a stay is a more difficult
question: Would the IMF's proposal make sovereign default overly
attractive? The IMF in its gatekeeper role says "trust us." But it is
not clear that the IMF, in its stabilizing role, would manage the gate
in a way that maximizes the sovereign's incentives to pay its debts.
A final point that might cause suspicion towards the IMF
proposal is that, to a considerable extent, creditors already have
112. Had Peru paid at home, in Peru, its bondholders would have been transferring amongst
themselves in unsafe banking channels.
113. Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 89.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
115. The latest reports are that numerous bondholder suits have been filed against
Argentina, at least some of them hoping to use the arguments made by Elliott against Peru. See
Pamela Druckerman, Frustrated Argentine Bondholders Try Suing-Ambition Is To Seize Assets
or at Least Gain Leverage; Why Managers Wait, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2002, at A6, 2002 WL-WSJ
3404256; see also Aaron Lucchetti & Jonathan Karp, Billionaire's Award May Snag Progress on
Argentine Debt, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at C1 (reporting on a $700 million judgment
awarded to Kenneth Dart in his suit against Argentina), 2003 WL-WSJ 3980356.
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collective control over maverick creditor lawsuits. Maverick lawsuits
with the highest potential to cause a sovereign meaningful pain are
those for accelerated amounts (as opposed to those for an individual
creditor's missed coupon payment). An acceleration, however, typically
needs to be authorized by 25 percent of the creditors. And once
authorized, it can be reversed by a simple majority vote. 116
We doubt creditors believe that this segment of the IMF's plan
will solve either coordination or hold out problems. It merely shifts
authority from the creditors to the IMF; authority the creditors would
rather retain. These points appear to be getting through to the IMF,
as demonstrated in recent internal discussions. It is considering
removing itself from the gatekeeper role. Members in distress would
instead activate the bankruptcy process by representing that their
debt had become unsustainable. 117 The IMF also is considering
dispensing with the automatic stay in favor of a requirement for a
three-quarters majority creditor vote.118
C. Majority Voting, Cramdown, and Fairness Review
Even though we question many provisions of the IMF
bankruptcy proposal, we believe it takes a step forward when it leaves
the determination of the fairness of the composition (the "plan" in
United States bankruptcy terminology) to the creditors, relegating any
adjudicatory authority within the system to a secondary role. Any
"cram down" of a restructuring plan thus would follow from the action
of a majority of the bondholders' peers rather than from a judge. 1 9
The omission of the judicial cram down will come as a jolt to
observers steeped in United States bankruptcy practice. Chapters 9
and 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code both provide for
substantive review of the composition for fairness by a federal judge as
a precondition to giving it binding effect on dissenting creditors.' 20
116. For an explication, see Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 104, at 1330-31.
117. This creates a problem respecting the case of a member with sustainable debt that
triggers the process opportunistically. Various alternative approaches are under consideration.
See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, 84-92.
118. Id. 124-38, 167. Any creditor receiving proceeds of an enforcement action would have
its bankruptcy payout proportionately reduced. Id. 133.
119. See Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 1003-09. Schwarcz stops just short of leaving out the
judge, suggesting that judicial cram down be held in reserve to be added to the system in case
the creditors fail to agree to compositions. Krueger, supra note 78, takes the additional step,
separating the judge from the approval process, and limiting the judge to intercreditor dispute
resolution.
120. 11 U.S.C. §§ 943(b), 1129(a) (2000).
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How could dispensing with judicial review enhance the attractiveness
of the process to the creditors? The exercise of working through the
answers to this question reveals the strengths of the IMF's minimal
bankruptcy scheme, even as it identifies some additional weaknesses.
1. The Best Interest of Creditors as a Judicial Standard
The IMF could articulate a fairness standard. Under this
Article's analysis, the "best interest of creditors" suggests itself as a
suitable standard for both simplicity and economic sensitivity. The
standard is easily stated: A composition realizes the best interest of
creditors when the creditors freely assent to it, induced by the fair
division of an adequate surplus. Applying the standard presents more
difficulties. This determination lies in classic "business judgment"
territory. It is the creditors who know what rehabilitates the borrower
as creditworthy. It is the creditors who have the handle on the
magnitude of the surplus under negotiation. It is the creditors who
best know the difference between fairness and greed when the surplus
is divided at the negotiating table. Given this, vesting the decision in
the hands of an adjudicator suggests an ulterior, distributive motive.
Even if the subject matter was more justiciable, it is hard to
envision an actor who could determine the best interest of creditors
and impose that judgment on classes of dissenting creditors without
the risk of losing the confidence of actors in the credit markets. The
distributive, and hence political, consequences of this decision may be
of too great a magnitude for technocratic treatment. Even the
selection of the decision maker would present a public choice problem.
The IMF, the prima facie candidate, has, among other problems,
disqualifying financial stakes in the subject matter. Experts could be
recruited, but would the context import sufficient reputational
constraints to prevent their falling prey to influence activities? 121
The creditors justifiably fear a tilted playing field-a
bankruptcy process that serves the purposes of the IMF and the
debtor, siphoning surplus to rehabilitation and repaying the IMF
rather than paying the creditors. The IMF appropriately alleviates
these suspicions by vesting decision-making authority in the creditors
themselves.
121. Significantly, the IMF's proposal envisions an adjudicatory authority only for process
questions, claim validation, and intercreditor dispute resolution. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra
note 8, 227-73.
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2. United States Bankruptcy Compared
In the United States bankruptcy context, fairness standards
protect the creditors. In theory, the judge reviews the plan to prevent
wealth transfers in the debtor's direction. For example, consider the
"best interest of creditors" standard of Chapter 9, which governs
municipal bankruptcy. 122 With municipal reorganization, as with
sovereign default, 123 liquidation is not an option and local politics
create a prima facie possibility of strategic default. In addition, the
taxpayers are parties in interest; thus, Chapter 9 gives them a special
right to appear and object to the plan. 124 The Chapter 9 process
protects taxpayer interests in other ways as well: The creditors are not
accorded the right to demand that municipal services be cut back so as
to return the debtor to solvency; municipal officials retain some
discretion to determine the effects of additional tax on community
welfare.1 25 This does not, at first blush, seem creditor protective. But
creditor concessions respecting the tax burden are as unavoidable in
the municipal context as they are in sovereign context.' 26 Citizens of a
city are mobile, at least when compared to citizens of sovereign
nations. If the municipal tax burden becomes excessive, the citizens
most able to pay the taxes will move someplace else.1 27 Although a
city cannot be liquidated, an excessive tax burden imposed for the
benefit of creditors can destroy the city.1 28 As a result, even though
the defaulting city conceivably could pay the creditors in full in the
long run (just like a defaulting sovereign), the Chapter 9 fairness
standard contemplates that the creditors may be asked to scale back
their rights. Accordingly, the municipal "best interest of creditors"
standard does not contemplate payment in full. Just how much the
122. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2000).
123. Raffer, supra note 77, at 305-10, works through the analogy in detail.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 943(a) (2000).
125. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 466-67 (1993); see also West Coast
Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 144 F.2d 654, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1940) (ruling plan to be
fair when providing for payments "that could reasonably be expected in all the circumstances").
126. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
127. See Tarullo, supra note 9, at 637-38.
128. Chapter 9 is nonetheless quite protective of the creditors' interest. The high possibility
of strategic default makes it relatively hard for a city to invoke its protection. Under 11 U.S.C. §
109(c), a filing municipality must be insolvent, it must desire to effect a plan, and it must have
either (1) obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims
of each class, (2) have attempted to negotiate with its creditors unsuccessfully, (3) be able to
show that negotiation was impracticable, or (4) reasonably believe that a creditor was attempting
to gain a preference.
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creditors may be required to give up is left to negotiation, subject to
the best interest standard and the requirement that the plan be
feasible. 129 At this point, creditor protection comes to the fore. The
best interest of creditors and feasibility standards collapse into a
unitary inquiry. As applied, the standards look to the city's ability to
pay: Its revenues and expenditures are compared, with the court
taking into account the city's taxing power and the possibility of tax
increases. 130 The bondholders are paid all that could reasonably be
expected in the circumstances. 31
Significantly, the Chapter 9 fairness standard applies even
though a majority of creditors already has approved the plan after
being presented a disclosure document vetted by the court.1 32 The
fairness test is in addition to the vote. The drafter of Chapter 9, in the
tradition of the United States law of corporate reorganization,
assumes that creditors' collective action problems make them
vulnerable to bad deals. On this scenario, insiders with private
agendas, whether agents of the defaulting municipality or agents of
financial intermediaries, can skew the deal to the creditors' detriment.
The creditors, deprived by the stay of cash flows for an extended
length of time, approve any deal that releases cash, even if an arms
length negotiator would have rejected the deal out of hand. The
fairness standard brings in a judge at the final stage to double check
the bargaining result from the creditors' point of view.
The assumptions underlying this story of creditor vulnerability
have come into question. Institutions have replaced individuals as the
leading bondholders.1 33 In the corporate distress context, they have
been shown to be capable of surmounting collective action problems
and saying "no" to an unsatisfactory offer from a distressed debtor. 134
129. Id. § 943(b)(7).
130. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 419-22 (1943).
131. See West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 654, 678 (9th Cir.
1940). For further discussion, see McConnell & Picker, supra note 125, at 464-67.
132. See § 1124.
133. Kahan, supra note 66, at 1060-62 n.104, drawing on the last reported data on United
States corporate bond ownership (from 1995), reports that households own only 15 percent of
outstanding corporate bonds, while holding 41 percent of outstanding equities. He also reports
that institutional bond owners are considerably more concentrated than institutional
stockholders. Id. at 1061-62. The five largest holders often own 25 percent of an outstanding
issue and a majority can be made up of the largest twenty to fifty holders. Id.
134. Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant
Changes?, 66 J. BUS. 499, 512 (1993); see also Lewis S. Peterson, Note, Who's Being Greedy? A
Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Holdouts and Coercion in Debt Tender and Exchange
Offers, 103 YALE L.J. 505, 513 (1993) (arguing that creditors, by organizing and making credible
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The same generally should be the case in the international context.135
One might argue, therefore, that fairness review can be jettisoned in
the sovereign context.
But there remains an argument for retaining fairness review in
the United States bankruptcy context. The United States
reorganization rules, under both Chapter 9 and the corporate section,
Chapter 11,136 never actually require approval by a majority of the
creditors, whether simple, absolute, or super. In both Chapter 9 and
Chapter 11, creditors divide themselves into multiple classes in
accordance with their priorities and other contract rights. No
particular class structure is imposed. The general creditors, for
example, could be organized in one class, or divided into a series of
classes of general creditors with particular affinities, such as trade
creditors, bondholders, short term noteholders, and subordinated
debentureholders.137  When the debtor presents a plan of
reorganization, approval is done on a class-by-class basis by majority
vote (a vote of two-thirds of the creditors in the class by number, one-
half of the total dollar amount of claims). The plan proceeds to a judge
for substantive review, provided that a single class has approved it by
majority vote. There is no requirement that the approving class hold
any particular minimum percentage of aggregate claims much less a
majority of claims. The result is that a plan can pass the voting stage
with the approval of only a small minority of creditors.
Gerrymandering in class formation therefore emerges as an important
strategic skill in bankruptcy proceedings. 138
Given the infirmities in the operative mode of democratic
decision making, it follows that a plan under Chapter 9 or 11 must
satisfy a list of substantive criteria. Under Chapter 9, the best interest
of creditors is the test.139 The Chapter 11 criteria include a three-part
fairness test. One part of the test keys into contracted-for priorities.
commitments to reject tender and exchange offers can prevent firms from making coercive
offers).
135. That Argentina had a large number of retail bondholders (particularly in Japan and
Germany), however, suggests that the story about institutional holders is not universally true.
136. Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 971-1010, provides a more extensive treatment of Chapter
11's pertinence to international bankruptcy. Our discussion has a limited purpose.
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b).
138. The most famous examples are "new value" cases involving single purpose real estate
corporations. The debtor allied itself with a separate class of unsecured creditors owed a small
amount to attempt to cram down a plan of reorganization on dissenting secured creditor with a
claim greater than the value of the real estate asset. The definitive case rejecting the ploy is
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526
U.S. 434, 437, 454-58 (1999).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2000).
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Another part of the test sets a minimum recovery floor. 140 The third
part of the test is a bar against unfair discrimination. 141 This holds
out the possibility that an objecting creditor could stop a plan
departing from the norm of pari passu treatment of creditors of equal
priority,142 with a result of horizontal equity trumping majority or
even supermajority rule. A plan with majority support can still be
unfair to a particular dissenter, whether due to collusion between the
debtor and a creditor coalition or to self-interested terms inserted by a
creditor coalition acting unilaterally.
3. Implications for Sovereign Bankruptcy
This exposition of fairness review under Chapters 9 and 11 has
implications for sovereign bankruptcy. If majority-approved
compositions are imposed on dissenting minorities without a fairness
check, then the voting process rises to paramount importance in the
proceeding's allocational politics. The IMF proposal reflects an
understanding of this when it suggests that all claimants be grouped
in a single class to approve the plan by a single supermajority vote. 143
This bypasses the United States practice of voting by classes.
Presumably, the number of votes per claimant will vary with the
amount of the claim. For voting purposes, other distinctions among
the creditors would be stripped away, including distinctions that loom
large in private bankruptcies, such as secured versus unsecured and
senior versus subordinated status. This should not present a problem
140. The first part applies to dissenting classes. § 1129(a)(8). The second part applies to
dissenting creditors individually. Id. § 1129(a)(7). Each part addresses the value received by the
dissenters under the plan. When a class as a whole rejects the plan, the plan fails the test if (a)
the dissenting class receives anything less than the full value of its claim and (b) any class junior
to the dissenting class receives any proceeds under the plan. Id. § 1129(b)(2). This is the absolute
priority rule. It is applied by reference to the going concern value of the reorganizing firm: If the
firm's value exceeds the amount necessary to pay the dissenting class in full, there will be room
to allow junior creditors to get some payment on their claims.
Under the second part, dissent by an individual creditor defeats the plan if the plan provides
the creditor anything less than the amount the creditor would receive if the firm were liquidated.
Id. § 1129(a)(7).
141. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
142. Note that the case law does not require strict pari passu treatment. See In re Aztec Co.,
107 B.R. 585, 589-90 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (setting out a four part test).
143. See Krueger, supra note 78; see also INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, 165-75.
The IMF proposal would combine the aggregate voting approach, on a three quarters majority
vote of all claims, together with a class organization structure for purposes of negotiation of the
terms of the reorganization bargain. In the authors' contemplation, a plan could treat different
classes differently so long as it garnered the requisite aggregate vote.
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in the sovereign context. Secured and subordinated lending are rare;
only official sector creditors like the IMF claim priority status.
144
The question, which we take up later, is whether material
intercreditor conflicts of interest, washed out at the voting stage,
nevertheless could influence the terms of the composition. Note that
the IMF proposal does contemplate an adjudicatory authority that
addresses intercreditor disputes. 145  But the problems the IMF
specifies for adjudication concern only ex ante contract rights-
matters like preferential payments, the prohibition of which are
fundamental to bankruptcy jurisprudence. Our question, instead, goes
to ex post relationships rather than ex ante rights. 46 Conflicts of
interest can arise within groups of creditors, leading to differing views
about the best interest of the group. Creditors that are nationals of the
sovereign (whether individuals or firms) may see things differently
than foreign creditors. Similarly, creditors with continuing lending
relationships with the sovereign may view plan terms differently from
creditors intending to exit. Majority rule addresses the problem only
by reference to the numbers. If conflicts taint only small numbers of
creditors, the plan's integrity should not be affected. But if special
interests encompass a majority or near majority, problems of
discrimination could arise. The IMF's present proposal holds out no
means to address this problem.
D. Summary
The IMF proposal appears to follow from deductive reasoning.
At the starting point lies the cluster of incentive problems the IMF
encountered in its 1990s bailouts. These problems are then taken to
the corporate bankruptcy template. There the IMF planner selects
instruments that might help. The problem is that the creditors would
rather keep many of these instruments for themselves. In addition,
144. See Gelpern, supra note 111, at 11-19 (describing sovereign debt contracting practice,
including the informal nature of prioritization). But significant distinctions remain. Different
issues of debt have different interest rates and durations, factors impacting significantly on their
market values. But these intercreditor differences are ignored in United States bankruptcy
practice.
145. Krueger, supra note 78.
146. The subsequent discussion in INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, 155-64, mentions
intercreditor disputes without clearly specifying a source of authority for their determination.
Both creditors committees and the system's adjudicatory authority are mentioned. The Report is
also unclear on the question of what law would apply. See id. 264 (mandating application of
"relevant national law" to substantive disputes and the dispute resolution forum's "own law" for
procedural issues).
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these grants of authority to the IMF do not themselves solve creditor
collective action problems.
What happens when the hypothesized scenario fails to play out
and the standstill imports no rapid relief? One suspects that the
process would be deployed to pressure creditors to facilitate relief by
making extraordinary give ups. In other words, there is the danger
that the IMF will use the tools of the bankruptcy scheme to effectuate
its agenda and not that of the creditors. In light of that possibility, a
rational creditor might prefer the status quo, where relief is not rapid,
but patience and an upturn in the business cycle can return the
sovereign to health. Thus rehabilitated in the fullness of time, the
sovereign returns to its creditors to make a more favorable deal. The
IMF's omission of judicial cram down becomes all the more important
on this extended distress scenario. The creditors must be left free to
say "no" and wait it out. 147
IV. THE UNANIMOUS ACTION/COLLECTIVE ACTION PUZZLE
All sides came into the crises of the 1990s sharing the
assumption that the shift from bank lending to bond issuance
implicated intractable coordination problems. This assumption
followed from experiences in the debt crises of the 1980s, when
restructuring procedures were disorderly, even with long-term players
at the table and norms of cooperation in play. Hundreds of creditors
with disparate views had to be brought into line, and UACs
complicated this task. 48 Composition was achieved only with official
sector intervention and years of negotiation. The small amount of
bonded debt was put off to one side, and allowed to escape from
restructuring on the theory that bondholder coordination was too hard
to procure.' 49 The assumption that bondholders with UACs could not
be brought to agreement on compositions benefited the bondholders in
the bailouts, as they stood to one side collecting the proceeds of
emergency loans.
These assumptions changed after 1999 when Pakistan,
Ecuador, and Ukraine successfully concluded compositions with
147. A term the proposal omits also looms large on this scenario-the supermajority
approval percentage. The creditors will want a number above three-quarters majority used in
British contracts; the proposal's promoters will want a number below it.
148. See Michael M. Chamberlin, Revisiting the IMF's Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposal and
the Quest for More Orderly Sovereign Work-Outs, Remarks at the Institute for International
Economics Conference "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards" (Apr. 2, 2002),
http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/rid7mac.pdf.
149. See Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 190.
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dispersed bondholder participation. These compositions were of the
preemptive variety, 150 mooted as exchange offers, and successfully
closed before liquidity problems became serious. Vulture investors did
not disturb the proceedings. There was value on offer in the
compositions and the vultures accepted it instead of holding out for
more. 151 The success of these initiatives surprised the bond market: In
response to the closing of the Pakistan composition, borrowing costs of
other countries (countries with no significant economic connections to
Pakistan) increased by twenty-five to ninety-five basis points. 152
Now that the era of bondholder immunity from restructuring is
over, the IMF argues that bondholders need a fair and predictable
process in which to bargain over compositions. The IMF points out
that exchange offers exploit bondholder coordination problems,
skewing the field of contract in the debtor's favor. The debtor, seeking
to maximize its bargaining power, presents the compositions on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, after brief consultation with only a handful of
large bondholders. 53 For the most part, no "collaborative dialogue"
occurs. 154 A bankruptcy regime would offer a committee structure that
would make such negotiations feasible.
The United States Treasury rejected these arguments and took
the lead in advocating a contractual alternative (and for a time even
blocked attempts by other members of the G-7 to issue stronger words
of support for the IMF plan).155 Like the bankruptcy proponents, the
contractarians recognize a need for concerted action within the
international financial community, but they focus on the need for a
150. See Punam Chuham & Federico Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the 1990s: What
Have We Learned? 26-27, http://www.utdt.edu/-fsturzen/chuhanfinal.pdf (Nov. 24, 2003); supra
text accompanying note 57.
151. Argentina also closed a large preemptive exchange in 2001. This was a voluntary
operation, eschewing the coercive device of the exit consent. Approximately one third of
Argentina's debt was exchanged, amounting to one half of eligible bonds. Ninety percent of
Argentina's retail European investors exchanged. ADAM LERRICK & ALLAN H. MELTZER,
CARNEGIE MELLON GAILLIOT CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT: THE PRIVATE SECTOR
CAN RESOLVE BANKRUPTCY WITHOUT A FORMAL COURT 4 (Apr. 2002),
http://www.emcreditors.com/pdf/n_JEC%20Sov%2OBankruptcy%2OStudy%20.pdf
152. Matthew R. McBrady & Mark S. Seasholes, Bailing-In 4 (Dec. 20, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
153. INT'L MONETARY FUND, INVOLVING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE RESOLUTION OF
FINANCIAL CRISES-RESTRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BONDS 14-16 (2001).
154. See Krueger, supra note 78.
155. See Taylor, supra note 11. Although Taylor's position in April 2002 appeared to be an
outright rejection of the IMF's statutory proposal, the Treasury's stance appears to have softened
to one of considering both proposals (while still favoring the contractual approach). See Michael
M. Phillips, Support Builds for Plan to Ease Debt Loads of Developing Nations, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 17, 2002, at A16.
[Vol. 57:1
2004] SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM
transition from UACs to CACs. As we have seen, UACs make it hard
to garner creditor assent to a composition. Bankruptcy proponents
argue that this strengthens the case for mandatory intervention.
Contractarians reverse this argument, drawing on two assumptions:
First, compositions in theory create value; and second, UACs in theory
benefit only opportunists who hold up rational creditors who seek
access to the value created. Given both assumptions, the bondholders
should be willing to exchange their UAC bonds for CAC bonds. All one
need do is make a public offer of the new CAC bonds and let the
market price them. 156 The price will, in any event, exceed that of the
UAC bonds, inducing across-the-board exchanges by the old
bondholders, 157 even the vultures. 58
Experts are drafting new model provisions for sovereign debt
contracts. These include: 59
156. Presumably, the stronger the IMF policy against bailouts, the lower the price.
157. See Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 151, at 3-4.
158. Any additional value-creating features of the proposed sovereign bankruptcy regime can
be included in the new bond contracts. For example, if a standstill declared by the IMF creates
value, the new bond contracts can channel enforcement through an indenture trustee whose
enforcement powers yield to the standstill. Taylor, supra note 11. If subordination to new loans
made after a default makes the bondholders better off, the pari passu clauses in the bonds can
open up an exception. See Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 151, at 3-4. If creditors need to delegate
bargaining authority to representatives, that too can be done in advance in the contracts. See
Taylor, supra note 11, 1 13.
There is a rich literature advocating contractually authorized bankruptcy. See, e.g., Alan
Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1820-39
(1998); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71
TEX. L. REV. 51, 100-21 (1992).
159. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 90. See also Miller, supra note 1, at 183-97, for an
overview. See also G-7 FIN. MINISTERS & CENT. BANK GOVERNORS, DECLARATION 9 4-9 (1998)
(examining and suggesting reforms to the international financial system), at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g7/103098dc.htm; G-7 FIN. MINISTERS & CENT. BANK
GOVERNORS, STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS TT 11-13 (2001), at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/ fm010707.htm;
GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES IT 4-10 (1996) (considering
means to deal with future sovereign liquidity crises), available at http://www.bis.org
publ/gten03.htm; INT'L MONETARY & FIN. COMM., BD. OF GOVERNORS, IMF, COMMUNIQUE 11
(2001) (looking forward to exploration of increased private sector involvement in crisis
prevention and management), at http://www.imf.org/externall np/cm/2001/010429b.htm; see also,
e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A
PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 9-18 (1999) (offering "pragmatic" proposals for reform); BARRY
EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN
DEBTORS 28-54 (1995) (discussing options and offering an agenda for reform); Lee C. Buchheit, A
Lawyer's Perspective on the New Financial Architecture, 14 J. INT'L BANKING L. 225 (1999),
reprinted in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ARCHITECTURE 235 (Rosa M. Lastra
ed., 2001); Lee C. Buchheit, The Collective Representation Clause, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1998,
at 9, 9-11 (considering possible changes to bond documentation); Lee C. Buchheit, Majority
Action Clauses May Help Resolve Debt Crises, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1998, at 13, 13-14; Lee C.
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(1) Provisions aggregating all the issuer's bonds into one class
for purposes of approving a composition. The CACs would permit the
modification of payment terms by a majority fraction of the bonds that
is significantly less than the current 100 percent requirement.
(2) Clauses restricting individual bondholder enforcement
power. These enforcement constraints could include:
(i) Majority action enforcement clauses. These require
permission from a significant fraction of the bondholders before
an individual bondholder can bring suit. This clause, taken
together with a CAC respecting contract amendment, makes
restructuring easier by relaxing the unanimity requirement
and makes it harder for maverick creditors, in search of
preferential payments, to bring disruptive litigation.
(ii) Super Trustee provisions. Trustees under current
New York-issued sovereign bond contracts perform largely
ministerial tasks. 160 Super Trustee provisions would grant the
trustees significantly more authority. The Super Trustee would
be able to make substantive decisions for the bondholders on
matters such as whether to bring suit for unpaid amounts and
whether to accept a restructuring offer. A Super Trustee would
act for the benefit of the creditor class as a whole, solving
collective action problems while eliminating the problem of
maverick litigation.
(iii) Sharing clauses. A sharing clause obliges any
bondholder who sues to share the recovery ratably with the
other bondholders. 161 As a practical matter, the sharing clause
removes the incentive for individual bondholders to sue
unilaterally in the hope of receiving an earlier and larger
payment than that received by other members of the group.
Designing new clauses is easy. The hard part is getting the
debtors and creditors to accept them. 62 The parties are far apart:
Buchheit, Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1998, at
17, 17-19 (exploring the use of contractual provisions in sovereign bonds).
160. This is a far cry from the world of common stock, where shareholders of large public
companies delegate almost all authority for important decisions to the Board of Directors.
161. Under the interpretation of the pari passu clause in Elliott v. Peru, Elliott Assocs., L.P.,
General Docket No. 2000/QR192 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000), this
is what the pari passu clause would operate to do. That particular interpretation, however, has
come under some challenge. See supra note 109.
162. Krueger, for the IMF, responds that the UAC-CAC swap will not work. Krueger, supra
note 78. The same creditor coordination problems that necessitate a mandatory bankruptcy will
get in the swap's way. Id. Opportunistic bondholders will hold out, with the result that
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While those on the drafting project talk about a two-thirds or three-
quarters majority rule, the Emerging Market Creditors Association
suggest something between 90 and 95 percent as an appropriate
majority rule. 163 Many sovereign debtors match the creditors in their
lack of enthusiasm for the contractual initiative. Presumably, they
fear that CACs could raise borrowing costs and retard the flow of
credit. But the market has begun taking baby steps towards CACs
despite these fears. We have seen offerings in New York using both a
75 percent and an 85 percent threshold. Although the 75 percent
threshold appears to be winning, it is still too early to predict where
the market will settle, or whether it will settle on CACs at all. 164
A full scale and rapid transition to CAC bonds in new
financings seems likely only if the IMF credibly conditions the
availability of credit on use of the new debt contract provisions. 165 But
even if such a stick proved effective, it would take years before a full
transition to CACs could take place. At the end of 2001, $354 billion of
sovereign debt was outstanding. Of this amount, 70 percent was
issued in the United States and Germany under UACs, while most of
the remaining 30 percent was issued in Britain and Luxembourg
under CACs. 166 If all bonds issued from 2002 onward contain CACs
but none of the existing UACs are amended, 80 percent of bonds would
be governed by CACs by 2010 and 90 percent by 2019.167
A near term contractual solution to the creditor coordination
problem, however, calls for a more heroic effort: All (or nearly all)
outstanding UAC bonds would have to be exchanged for CAC bonds. If
the contractual approach's basic assumption-that CACs create value
significant numbers of UAC bonds will remain in circulation. Id. Nor, absent a mandate, can
there be any guarantee that CACs will be universal in future bond issues. Id. Finally, absent a
neutral supervising authority, there will be no guarantee of a clean vote. Id.
163. See Michael M. Chamberlin, Executive Director EMTA, Souereign Debt Contracts: What
Do We Need to Change 3 (2002) (reporting on the view of the six emerging market debt trade
associations), http://www.emta.org/keyper/iifl017.pdf.
164. See Barham, supra note 93, at 13 (asking whether Argentina will choose the 75 percent
from Mexico and Uruguay or 85 percent from Brazil); Felix Salmon, Brazil Goes Off on a CACs
Tangent, EUROMONEY, June 2003, at 156, 156.
165. For a discussion of the difficulties which might arise in connection with this, see INT'L
MONETARY FUND, COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS-
ENCOURAGING GREATER USE 13, 15, 16-20 (2002).
Taylor suggests that the IMF could offer an interest rate reduction for sovereign borrowers
whose private sector bonds contain CACs. See Taylor, supra note 11. Taylor also mentions a
stick-the IMF would require any country using a credit facility to use CACs in its bonds. Id.
The previous administration also took a position against interference with contract rights, even
as it admitted that the contracts might be costly and inefficient. Tarullo, supra note 9, at 671.
166. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 165, at 5 tbl.I.
167. Id. at 6.
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by solving creditor coordination problems-is correct, then both
debtors and creditors should be clamoring for these CAC exchanges.
But there has been no such demand. So it appears that a carrot will be
needed in the form of additional consideration. Alternatively, a stick
could be wielded through the exit consent device, but these devices are
disliked in the creditor community.168 Plus, some exchanges will be
hard to effectuate, even with exit consents, because the issuers are
already in trouble. 169 If CACs do create value, why this resistance?
The discussion that follows shows that the CAC value story is
contestable. In the imperfect world we live in, a rational bondholder
may prefer the UAC.
A. Empirical Studies
A number of empirical studies seek to sustain (or falsify) the
claim that CACs create value. If the CAC value story is accurate, CAC
bonds should sell at lower yields than UAC bonds. But setting up a
pair of comparison bonds is difficult. Ideally, one would want thickly
traded bonds from the same issuer, with identical contract terms
(other than, of course, the amendment clauses).1 70 No such bonds
exist; therefore, the studies proceed on a rougher basis.
One set of studies finds that CACs reduce borrowing costs for
the most creditworthy issuers, and increase them for less creditworthy
issuers. The inference is that good credits benefit from the prospect of
coordination and lower default costs, while bad credits do not benefit
because the cost advantages of the CAC are outweighed by moral
hazard and default risk.171 Other studies find no evidence that CACs
affect borrowing costs. 172 Here, the inference is that the cost benefits
of easy restructuring are cancelled out by the attendant decrease in
the costs of default and aggravation of the moral hazard problem.
168. Id. at 19.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Is Aggregation a Problem for Sovereign Debt
Restructuring?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 80 (2003) (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS); see also Barry
Eichengreen et al., Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
(forthcoming 2003) (reporting on recent empirical research on the topic), http://papers.nber.org
papers/w10095.pdf.
172. See TORBJORN BECKER ET AL., BOND RESTRUCTURING AND MORAL HAZARD: ARE
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES COSTLY? 25-26 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 01/92,
2001); see also Anthony Richards, The Usage and Pricing of Collective Action Clauses in
International Bond Issues (May 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). Still
more studies find that CAC issuers pay a small premium. Contrariwise, some report a small
discount for UK issuance. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 165, at 12.
[Vol. 57:1
SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM
We question whether any study in the present context can yield
a measure of the relative value of CACs and UACs. Even if a pair of
comparison bonds existed and the market perceived an advantage in
holding the CAC bond, it is not clear that bond prices would reflect the
market's perception. Hypothesize an issuer having CAC bonds and
UAC bonds outstanding simultaneously. If the issuer goes into
distress, a bondholder coordination problem arises respecting the UAC
bonds. If the UAC bondholders cannot be induced to agree to a
composition, then any composition tentatively reached with the CAC
bondholders presumably fails as well. The final effectiveness of the
CAC issue composition (if properly drafted) would be conditioned on
the closing of the compositions of all other issues of bonds. Otherwise,
the CAC issue would end up surrendering value while the UAC issue
withheld consent, causing a transfer of value from the CAC issue to
the UAC issue.
Extending this line of analysis, hypothesize an issuer having
only CAC bonds outstanding. Would that country's debt have a lower
coupon than debt of the same maturity of another country of equal
creditworthiness whose bonds contained UACs? We doubt it. Nothing
would guarantee that, in the event of distress at some future time, all
of the first country's issues still would be governed by CACs. This is
because nothing prevents a CAC borrower from negotiating a new
debt issue in New York using UACs, or, alternatively, from refunding
an existing CAC borrowing in New York under a UAC. The low coupon
CAC borrower, thus, could at any time turn itself into a borrower with
a potential creditor coordination problem. 173 Given this inherent
flexibility of status, it is difficult to see how a market yield comparison
could demonstrate the value differential between CACs and UACs. 174
The result is that the value creation story remains a theoretical
assertion. If the assertion is correct, however, we must account for the
market resistance to CACs by reference to frictions, behavioral biases,
173. The problem could be solved in the CACs themselves. The CACs would condition the
availability of majority amendment on majority amendment's availability in all of the issuer's
bonds. We are unaware of any real world use of such a provision.
174. Compare the study of the effect of projected restructuring costs due to aggregation
problems-that is, coordination costs stemming from a large number of bond issues outstanding,
each one of which separately would have to assent in a restructuring. By hypothesis, the larger
the number of bond issues outstanding, the greater the potential cost. Barry Eichengreen and
Ashoka Mody show that distributing the same principal amount of debt across different bond
issues raises the cost of debt on the tenth issue by about 8 basis points. Eichengreen & Mody,
supra note 171. The impact is greater when the issuer has a low credit rating. Interestingly, they
find that the presence or absence of CACs does not significantly effect the perceived costs of
aggregation. Id.
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path dependencies, and other imperfections. Alternatively, we can
question the value assertion itself. Perhaps CACs do not hold out a
first best equilibrium solution for sovereign debt contracting. If CACs
are not first best, then a rational creditor in a second best world might
choose a UAC.
B. Frictions and Imperfections
1. Ignorance and Myopia
The first wave of articles and reports on CACs, produced in the
mid and late 1990s, had an explanatory tone. The writers assumed
that sovereign debtors and creditors needed to learn about the clauses'
benefits. Once the market heard the word, it would pick up the value
on the table. 175 Yet, after a plethora of articles, numerous conferences,
and repeated official sector pronouncements, most new bond issues
done prior to 2003 still contained UACs. Given the bombardment of
material since the mid-1990s, no one can argue that the reason this
move did not begin prior to 2003 was that no one knew about the
CACs.
Continued attachment to UACs suggests myopia on the parties'
part, particularly amongst creditors. If creditors have a strong, albeit
irrational, preference for UACs, borrowers will cater to this preference
in order to avoid an increase in borrowing costs. This leaves open the
problem of explaining the creditors' irrational preference.
2. Drafting Inertia
Some research suggests that contracting parties are biased in
favor of using established, standard terms in their contracts. This is
referred to as the "status quo" bias.176 Perhaps we have such a
pattern of bias here, especially considering that the respective drafting
175. For example, take the articles by Lee Buchheit. See supra note 159. One sees a similar
tone in the early official sector reports exhorting the use of CACs, such as the 1996 Rey Report
that recommended the adoption of CACs as a measure to facilitate debt restructuring. GROUP OF
TEN, supra note 159. For a chronology of events, see Press Release, Dep't of Fin., Canada,
Reforming the Global Financial Architecture: A Chronology, available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/
news02/02-034e.html#Reforming.
176. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (arguing that parties to a contract view default terms as the status
quo and that parties prefer the status quo to other alternatives).
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practices of New York and London can be traced back to Victorian
times. 177
A status quo bias is not an immovable block, however. It is only
a bias. Even as people attach themselves to the contract terms that
they begin with or inherit, they still should be willing to switch in
order to capture significant benefits. The benefits claimed for CACs
seem significant enough to have induced a switch by now, if those
benefits actually exist.
3. Moral Hazard
Under the moral hazard story, creditors and defaulting
sovereigns both want bailouts.178 If their contracts have CACs, the
official sector-the rich countries and the international financial
institutions they control-will order the debtors to work out any
problems with their creditors. UACs, in contrast, let the distressed
debtors and creditors point to an insurmountable barrier to
restructuring. The official sector then has no option but to provide a
subsidy. The preference for UACs thus follows from opportunism.
But this story is incomplete. First, it only accounts for the
preference for UACs beginning in the mid-1990s. It does not explain
why UACs proliferated in the first place or why lenders in the private
sector often prefer them. 179 Second, not every distressed sovereign
gets bailed out, as the world saw with Argentina. It follows that a
bond issued by a country with a low likelihood of getting a bailout
could be more valuable with a CAC. But we see no such pattern.
Third, bailouts are not free. They come with conditions that further
the political interests of the IMF and its primary sponsors. 80 There
177. De Forest Billyou, Corporate Mortgage Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L.J. 595,
595-96 (1948). The "innovation externalities" identified by Kahan, supra note 66, at 1079, in
respect of the improvement of corporate trust indentures, do not obtain in respect of CACs and
UACs. An innovation externality deters contractual improvement because, absent patent
protection, the improvement is shared among the entire class of users. The sharing denudes the
innovating lawyers of an incentive to invest in improvements. Id. Here, in contrast, the
competing contract forms already are on the table. For the same reason, we see no network
externality deterrent here. Standard forms are available if the market wants to shift to CACs.
178. See supra text accompanying note 14.
179. See infra note 184.
180. For example, it is rumored that recent disbursements of funds to Pakistan and Turkey
were impliedly conditioned on supporting the anti-terrorism coalition and clamping down on
Islamic militants within their borders. Brazil provides a more explicit recent case. At the time of
its bailout, a pending election both contributed to the distress and gave rise to policy concerns in
the official sector. Leftist candidates who were leading in the polls were required to make public
guarantees that they would continue to support the current government's free market economic
policies--a step at least partially inconsistent with their political platforms. Further, it is
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may be some countries that are simply too big or too nuclear to be
allowed to fail. For the rest, it is not clear that strategic contracting
makes sense.
4. Signaling
Asymmetric information can explain the failure to adopt CACs.
The story is that creditors do not have full information about debtors,
and thus worry about unobservable downside factors. When a debtor
asks for a CAC, the creditor infers that the debtor expects to default.
No debtor wants to signal itself as being at a high risk of defaulting;
therefore, no debtor asks for CACs.
Of course, if CACs create value in excess of the cost to the
debtor of the negative signal, then we should expect the debtors to
introduce them despite the signal. A first mover problem may explain
why this does not happen. Given inertia in the market, the first
issuers to change their contracts disrupt market expectations and, as
a result, incur special costs. Those costs would be compounded in the
case of a change from UACs to CACs because the benefits stemming
from the clauses accrue on a very long term. 81 It follows that the
costs may outweigh the benefits for the first mover, even though the
benefits far outweigh the costs for debtors as a whole.
There are three problems, however, with this explanation.
First, it looks only at the debtor's stake in the contract's amendment
terms. Thus, even if the explanation is correct, we still have to explain
why the creditors do not request CACs. Second, the story fails to
confront historic market practice. An issuer seeking a CAC always has
the option of taking its loan transaction to London. In so doing it runs
little chance of sending a negative signal respecting creditworthiness,
as New York does not take the good credits and London the bad.
Countries finance in London for a long list of reasons, like interest
rates, transaction costs, customers, and relationships with
intermediaries; all factors more important at closing than the choice of
a CAC over a UAC. Third, recent market developments rebut the
story. The first moves have taken place (we suspect with pressure
difficult for many countries to know, ex ante, whether they will qualify for a bailout in the event
of a future economic crisis. A couple of years ago, Pakistan was grouped with Ecuador and
Ukraine as a country unlikely to receive a bailout. The geopolitical shifts of 2001 brought it to
the front of the queue.
181. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 165, at 11. For a fuller discussion of frictions that
inhibit the improvement of standard form contracts, see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive
Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 353-65 (1996).
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from the Treasury), but to our knowledge there have been no
subsequent exchange offers to move from UACs to CACs.
5. Path Dependence
The practice divergence between New York and London can be
explained in part by legislative intervention and legal precedent. In
the United States, Section 316(a) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939
requires that contracts governing publicly issued bonds contain
UACs.182  Contrariwise, it has been suggested that the United
Kingdom requires inclusion of CACs in bonds under its law.183
Neither regulation extends to sovereign bonds, but such regulations
could have "locked in" the drafting practice in the two financial
centers. Departure from the forms disrupts expectations and causes
costs to be incurred. Other things being equal, could not the
intermediaries be sticking mindlessly to the inherited forms, which
have been influenced by regulation?
The problem is that other things are not equal under the CAC
superiority story. Given value on the table, New York underwriters
would request redrafting of the standard forms, and the lawyers
would do what they were told despite their practice traditions and any
associated cognitive biases.18 4
182. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (2000). The purpose of the
section was to discourage out-of-court compositions so as to force the parties into the then new
Chapter X bankruptcy procedure, where strong judicial supervision was provided for. Roe, supra
note 6, at 234. Roe argues, correctly, that subsequent changes in bankruptcy law and practice
remove the need for the mandate. Id. at 316. Our point is that removal of the mandate would
bring no change in the actual provisions of bonds, which would continue to include UACs.
183. INT'L MONETARY FUND, REPORT OF THE ACTING MANAGING DIRECTOR TO THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON PROGRESS IN REFORMING THE IMF
AND STRENGTHENING THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 54 (Apr.
12, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2O00/report.htm, cited in Tarullo, supra note 9, at
671 n.196.
184. Plus, the continuing presence in United States law of a UAC mandate respecting
publicly traded bonds does not dictate a UAC practice respecting many bonds and notes issued
outside of the mandate's parameters. These include privately placed notes, notes traded on the
so-called 144A market, bank term loans, and sovereign bonds. Yet, despite the absence of
regulations mandating the terms of any of these debt contracts, almost all use UACs in the
United States. Howard J. Kashner, Majority Clauses and Non-bankruptcy Corporate
Reorganizations-Contractual and Statutory Alternatives, 44 BUS. LAW. 123, 124-25 (1988). The
UAC practice, by the way, also shows up with respect to bank term loans in the United
Kingdom-that country's dominant mode of debt finance. JOHN ARMOUR & SIMON DEAKIN,
NORMS IN PRIVATE INSOLVENCY: THE "LONDON APPROACH" TO THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL
DISTRESS (Univ. of Pa. L. Sch., Inst. of L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 173, 2001).
CAC bonds appeared in American financial history in cognizable numbers in only one era.
This was during the Depression, when new bonds issued in reorganizations of insolvent single
purpose real estate corporations sometimes contained CACs. According to testimony by an SEC
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6. Summary
The foregoing explanations, taken separately or as a group, fail
to explain why CACs have failed to proliferate (assuming that the
value story has merit). But they do suggest that frictions will retard
the present contractual reform initiative. They also leave us with a
question: Whether lenders for more than a century have been
investing billions of dollars pursuant to manifestly irrational
contracts?
C. The Persistent Preference for Unanimous Action
Why, despite the logic of majority action, do American lenders
retain their preference for unanimity not only in sovereign bonds but
in all types of lending? We have three suggestions. The first follows
from enforcement theory: UACs deter default by making it more
expensive. Our second suggestion follows from reputational theory:
When a rehabilitating debtor makes a composition offer, the process
context influences the division of the surplus; UACs force the debtor to
make a higher offer. The third suggestion looks to intercreditor
conflicts. Coalitions within the creditor group or amongst creditors
and the debtor can use the majority action privilege to impose unequal
outcomes. The rational creditor will require a defense against such
exploitation. Absent a robust backstop of intercreditor good faith
duties, only a right of individual dissent suffices.
1. The Cost of Default
The value of a CAC lies in cheaper creditor coordination and
enhanced chances of composition. But there are costs. Whether by
reducing out of pocket costs or by making compositions more
accessible, CACs make default cheaper. To the extent default is
cheaper, strategic default becomes a more viable alterative.
staffer at the Hearings on the Trust Indenture Act, CAC bonds constituted about 10 percent of
the market. Hearings on H.R. 5220, 76th Cong. 284-85 (1939). Much like dealmakers at today's
IMF, the dealmakers in those reorganizations operated in a world without a bankruptcy
procedure that imposed majority rule (at least prior to 1934). Also, like actors at the IMF, they
had become exasperated with coordination problems stemming from UACs. Billyou, supra note
177, at 595-96. Unfortunately for the CAC value story, however, those actors also were famously
sleazy. The real estate bond firms, precursors of the junk bonds dealers of the 1970s and 1980s,
had been hawking speculative paper to credulous retail investors for decades, promising high
returns for no risk. See JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN
AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN 157-72 (1992) (providing a history of early
twentieth century real estate finance).
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But do sovereign lenders really incur a cognizable risk of
strategic default? A default makes sense for a sovereign if the savings
from the composition exceed the costs of default. If we assume a debt
structure with CACs, that result follows only if the debtor persuades a
majority of creditors to vote for the restructuring. We think it likely
that institutional lenders will vote against such a restructuring if they
think that the country is acting opportunistically. If we project
correctly, the advantage of UACs over CACs with respect to strategic
default deterrence is negligible. UACs would have a more cognizable
advantage if information asymmetries can prevent big lenders from
distinguishing between a strategic and a distress default. But, if there
were a real risk of that happening, one would have expected creditors
to be more enthusiastic about the IMF bankruptcy proposal. The IMF
makes itself the gatekeeper in the proposal, undertaking to analyze a
country's true financial condition before commencement of a
composition process. Now, even though the creditors had many
reasons for opposing the IMF's proposal, with lack of trust in the IMF
no doubt prime among them, we suspect that they saw no
countervailing benefit in IMF gatekeeping. Our guess is that the
creditors believe themselves and other market actors, such as credit
rating agencies and investment banks, to be quite capable of
distinguishing between strategic and distress defaults.
A complication remains. We also have seen that sovereign
defaults have strategic overtones even in distress situations:
Sometimes government actors decide to default, making a political
decision that weighs the impact of tax hikes and other strains on the
domestic economy against the cost of default.18 5 If CACs influence
these calculations so as to make default more likely, then it follows
that the contractual initiative does not hold out a free lunch, at least
to a private creditor.
Nobody knows where these costs and benefits net out. Recall
the ambiguous implications of the empirical studies canvassed in the
previous section. One study, finding no evidence that CACs lower
borrowing costs, 8 6 reasonably inferred that the decrease in the cost of
default and the attendant increase in the magnitude of the moral
hazard problem caused by CACs could offset the benefits of easy
restructuring. On this analysis, a creditor rationally could choose
between a CAC and a UAC based on a coin flip. From this, an
explanation for the century-long divergence in the drafting traditions
185. See supra text accompanying note 51.
186. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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of New York and London follows. As between the two apparently equal
choices, any small factor in the legal, economic, or cultural background
can cause the practice to tip in favor of one approach over the other.
The choice having been made, the conservative, repetitive dynamic of
debt contracting assures that the choice becomes universal in the
market and prevails for an indefinite period.
Recall that a contrasting study suggested that creditworthy
borrowers might prefer CACs because cheaper creditor coordination
would lower the creditors' default costs. Borrowers with bad credit
would use UACs because, with default a more immediate prospect, the
cost advantages of the CAC would be outweighed in the lenders' minds
by moral hazard and default risk.18 7 But this theory can support the
opposite conclusion as well.188 Bolton and Scharfstein hypothesize
that a low-quality firm would find it optimal to maximize its
liquidation value: A distress default being likely, it would want
contracts carrying as little cost as possible in the event of default. The
smaller the number of creditors and the lower the voting barrier, the
cheaper the liquidation and the greater the value of the debt.18 9 In
contrast, with high credit borrowers, strategic default is the dominant
problem. Factors increasing the cost of such a default-such as
multiple creditors and tougher voting rules-enhance the value of the
debt. 190
We emerge with opposing suggestions: CACs for good credits
and UACs for bad credits, or alternatively, UACs for good credits and
CACs for bad credits. This ambiguous economics fails to predict a
logical dominance by either UACs or CACs.1 91
2. The Division of the Surplus
Bolton and Scharfstein explain that the greater the number of
creditors and the higher the percentage of creditor votes needed to
approve a renegotiation, the lower the debtor firm's surplus in the
renegotiation.1 92 This point says something important about United
States creditors' preference for UACs.
187. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
188. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of
Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1, 19-20 (1996).
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id.
191. Patrick Bolton notes an additional complicating factor. Bolton, supra note 76. A
borrower's commitment to excessively high restructuring costs does more than build in a
disincentive to default. Id. at 31. It also builds in an incentive to overborrow. Id. at 31-32.
192. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 188, at 18.
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Consider the game posited below:
Exchange Offer Game
Creditor B
Cooperate Defect
Creditor A Cooperate 625, 625 550, 800
Defect 800, 550 400, 400
The set up assumes that a sovereign borrower in
distress has offered its two creditors a composition of $550.
The offer is stingy: If the creditors surmount their collective
action problem and negotiate with the borrower, they can get
the offer increased to $625. Holding out, "defecting" in the
parlance of the prisoner's dilemma, can mean an $800 payoff.
If both creditors hold out, the deal fails and the recovery is
$400 received after an extended default and a long lapse of
time.
It is unclear what a creditor should do. The italicized outcomes
in the chart show A's optimal moves given the alternatives of
cooperation and defection by B. If B accepts the offer, A is better off
holding out and taking the $800. But if B holds out, A is better off
cooperating and taking the $550, thereby avoiding the worst-case
payoff of $400. Since A does not know what B is going to do, it is not
clear how A should play. A multiple equilibrium outcome results-the
situation is unstable.
The posited payoffs lend insight into the divergence of views
between the official sector and the creditors. Bankruptcy proponents
focus on the avoidance of the $400 payoff and the realization of the
$625 payoff, arguing that only a bankruptcy process offers the
creditors a stable context in which to realize the $625. The
contractarians also focus on the avoidance of the $400, positing that
with CACs and a large group of creditors, the prospect of an $800
recovery is eliminated, and with it the $400 worst-case scenario. The
question is how the dispersed creditors then surmount the negotiating
barrier presented by the take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer of $550, so
as to benefit from a more equal division of the surplus. The magnitude
of the resulting problem depends on the barrier's height. Given
institutional bond holding, the barrier may not present a substantial
problem in the real world. Informal coordination is possible amongst a
small group of lead institutions, making it possible for the group to
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reject $550 and bargain for $625 as a group without the need for a
bankruptcy process.
The UAC proponent sees things differently. If all the bonds
have CACs, the take-it-or-leave-it offer is $550. The question is
whether the offer would be higher if all the bonds had UACs. We
answer the question in the affirmative, and suspect that most
creditors do too. Given information asymmetries, the creditors will
have a range of upset prices respecting acceptance of the debtor's offer.
If the debtor needs 100 percent or a supermajority, it will have to
increase its offer to meet the reservation prices at the higher end of
the range. 193 The UAC thus counteracts the disorganized creditors'
tendency to cut and run to take a lowball offer.
Of course the UAC creates a hold out problem even as it causes
the offer to rise. But a hard-nosed bondholder has a response: If the
offer makes a generous split of the surplus, holdouts will not be so
numerous as to threaten the deal. No one ever expects 100 percent
participation in a composition under UACs. Yet such exchange offers
close all the time on the basis of supermajority acceptance. 194
Meanwhile, neither the bankruptcy advocates nor the contractarians
offer evidence that holdouts regularly cause exchange offers to fail. 195
When offers do fail, it may be that they are too low and, as a result,
attract something much less than a supermajority of creditors. 96
193. This is nothing more than the law of downward sloping demand. It explains why
bidders make tender offers for majority blocks with back end mergers, rather than attempt to
purchase firms through open market purchases. See generally Richard Booth, Discounts and
Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1055 (1991) (arguing that the existence of
downward sloping demand explains various market phenomena); Lynn Stout, Are Takeover
Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235,
1259-75 (1990).
194. The creditor associations are asserting that a 90 percent participation would be
needed-a daunting figure. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 90. But a look at the leading private
case, Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986), shows a complex exchange offer
with an upset participation requirement of 85 percent or less. That upset calculation will change
from situation to situation.
195. See Stewart Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from
Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161, 169-70 (1997) (showing that the holdout problem
does not seem to be so severe as to prevent the accomplishment of restructurings respecting
public debt, particularly given use of coercive devices like exit consents); see also Jean Helwege,
How Long Do Junk Bonds Spend in Default?, 54 J. FIN. 341, 348-49 (1999).
196. We draw indirect support for this assertion from Marcel Kahan and Bruce Tuckman, Do
Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes? 66 J. BUS. 499 (1993). This presents the
results of a study of 58 consent solicitations in which an issuer of widely held debt requested the
modification of existing covenants but did not request either interest deferral or principal
forgiveness. Id. at 502-03. Since covenants tend to be absent from investment grade debt, nearly
all of the issues surveyed were junk bonds. Id. at 503. The solicitations broke down as follows: 25
were simple consent solicitations in which receipt of an offered cash payment was conditioned on
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A numerical example will help explain this. Assume that a
sovereign is in default on debt with a face amount of $100. These
bonds are trading for $65, a value that can be expected to fall further
unless rehabilitation succeeds by means of a composition. The
sovereign, now on the road to recovery, can afford to pay $95. The
surplus is $95 minus $65 or $30. Assume that with a CAC providing
for amendment by a two-thirds majority, the sovereign can get the
requisite participation by offering a bond worth $75-a two-thirds to
one-third split of the surplus in the sovereign's favor. With a UAC, it
will have to offer more. Assume that if it offers a bond worth $85, it
will get 90 percent participation under the UAC, leaving holdouts with
face value claims of $10. The value of the $85 exchange offer is as
follows:
$85 x .90 = $76.50 (consideration to participants)
$100 x .10 = $10.00 (consideration to holdouts)
$ 86.50 (total yield to bondholders)
This recovery reverses the percentage division of the surplus-
now it is roughly two-thirds to the bondholders and one-third to the
sovereign. The problem lies in the possibility that too many
bondholders will hold out and defeat the offer, leaving the holders
with bonds only worth $65. Let us assume that composition failures
due to holdouts are rare-a 20 percent possibility. The question is
consent to the amendment; 24 were accompanied by tender offers; 8 were accompanied by
exchange offers; 1 was accompanied by a tender offer and an exchange offer. Id. A requirement of
an exit consent or consent as a condition to payment was present in 44 of the 48 offers for which
data could be found. Id. at 506-07. The issuers sought, inter alia, to make leveraged acquisitions
(31 percent), make dividends or other stockholder payments (13.8 percent), conduct
recapitalizations (10.3 percent), sell assets (8.6 percent), and issue more debt (6.9 percent). Id. at
504 tbl.1.
The average payment offered in those solicitations exchanging the consent for cash was
$20.51 per $1,000 face value; the median cash payment was $15 per $1,000 face value; nine of
the 23 cash offers were above $20; the two largest were $60 and $95. Id. at 511. Evidence of the
result of the solicitation was found for 52 of the cases, and in 83 percent of these the solicitation
succeeded. Id. at 503. A statistical survey of the prices of the issues showed that 29 of 42 issues,
or 69 percent had positive abnormal returns around the time of the announcement of the
transaction: The average abnormal bond return was 2.34 percent, while the average abnormal
return for the stock of the issuer was 9.5 percent. Id. at 510. Thus, the study showed that the
solicitations increased the value of both the debt and the stock.
Kahan and Tuckman conclude that the issuers have not been exploiting the structural
opportunity to coerce that the bond contracts create. Id. at 513. They hypothesize that the
bondholders can, in practice, coordinate their response so as to insure an adequate level of
payment. Id. As evidence, they cite the formation of bondholder groups in 12 cases; of these 12
solicitations, 11 either failed or had their terms modified before approval. Id. at 512. Overall, in
42 percent of the cases, the issuers modified the terms after an initial failure to obtain consents.
Id.
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whether that possibility makes the CAC offer more attractive. It does
not:
86.50 x .80 = 69.20
65.00 x .20 = 13.00
$ 82.20 > $75
Now say the probabilities are 50-50:
86.50 x .50 = 43.25
65.00 x .50 = 32.50
$ 75.75 > $75
The expected value of the UAC exchange offer is still greater
than that of the CAC offer. Only at under a 50-50 chance of success
does the CAC create value for the creditors as a whole.
The above numbers are our invention, posed for the sake of
argument. To the extent they strike the reader as plausible, it follows
that UACs are not irrational, and CAC value is not a sure thing.
3. Exploiting Minority Creditors
Finally, CACs present a risk of opportunistic collusion between
the debtor and a majority of creditors to exploit a minority of the
creditors. The debtor makes a side payment to a majority of the
creditors, inducing them to support a composition that reduces its
overall debt burden by extracting value from the minority creditors.
For example, the large creditors may be promised future business with
the sovereign. This is not an unlikely eventuality in the sovereign
context, where the sovereign's incentive to compromise arises largely
from a desire to return to the credit markets. Thus, respecting a
particular composition on offer, the interests of primary lenders and
bondholders from the secondary market can diverge, with the
primaries lumping returns from the composition together with returns
from projected new deals with the sovereign, and the secondaries
looking only to the composition. Alternatively, a sufficient fraction of
the debt may be purchased at low prices by entities sympathetic to the
sovereign. These sympathizers then validate a composition that
exploits the minority creditors. 197
With a UAC, a minority creditor does not have to worry about
majority opportunism. If it thinks the deal burdens its interest
unduly, it can hold out.
197. See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 68.
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D. Summary
The foregoing makes us dubious of the CAC value story. But we
do not claim to have refuted it. After all, CAC bonds have been issued
for more than a century in London without friction or objection. But
we do claim to have refuted the charge that bondholder objections to
CAC exchanges (and sovereign bankruptcy) stem only from
opportunism related to IMF bailouts. This leads us to predict that
there will be no spontaneous move for universal CACs. If the
contractual strategy is to accomplish anything, the IMF, the United
States Treasury, and the other G-7 nations will have to do more than
simply induce an initial move. The question they need to ask is: What
steps will make the move pervasive and stable?
V. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND GOOD FAITH
Movement to CACs began in 2003, evidenced by several New
York bond issues and successful exchange offers. 198 Where then do we
find ourselves? To the extent the CAC-UAC preference differential is
narrow and historically grounded, these recent transactions could
herald a preference shift. But, to the extent the preference differential
is based on considerations from the core of the debtor-creditor
incentive structure, the transactions could amount to only an isolated
episode. One could then see movement back toward UACs in new bond
issues (and in any exchange offers, as a sweetener).
Either way, the new equilibrium sought by CAC proponents
could be destabilized if collusive behavior skews the results of
restructurings for the benefit of majority creditor coalitions. This could
happen when a majority of bondholders approves a restructuring that
allocates most of the surplus to the sovereign in exchange for the
sovereign's promise of future lending business. Alternatively, a one-
sided deal could result when a large percentage of the debt is held by
nationals of the sovereign (or other sympathetic entities). If such
incidents occurred, it would not take long for the markets to move
back to UACs, which provide an effective, if crude, mode of prevention.
It follows that a stable contractual transition to CACs presupposes the
control of side deals. This control could come from contract drafting or,
alternatively, from the backstop regime of contract law (specifically,
the good faith duty).
198. See Elmar B. Koch, Collective Action Clauses-The Way Forward, GEO. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2004).
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In this Part we argue that judges interpreting and applying
CAC bond contracts under New York law should take the initiative
and sculpt a regime of intercreditor good faith duties adequate to
police collusion and other opportunism on the part of bondholders of
distressed sovereigns.
A. Contract Drafting Versus Judicial Intervention
We confront at the outset the argument that sovereigns and
bondholders desiring to prohibit collusion will draft appropriate
exclusions in their contracts' voting provisions. Under this view of
contract law, the good faith duty operates as a gap filler that prevents
opportunism that the parties would have contracted to prohibit had
they thought of the contingency at the outset. Where, however, the
contingency was well-known to the parties ex ante, and they made no
provision preventing it, no constraint on self-interested conduct is
imposed ex post. Since the parties know about the possibility, their
silence implies consent. Even if consent cannot be implied on the facts
of the case, the judge should still refrain from intervention in order to
force parties to draft better contracts. 199
In the case of CAC bond contracts, the opportunistic action at
issue-the debtor colluding with a majority of creditors to exploit the
minority-would likely be envisioned at the outset by the parties. As
we have seen, fear of such opportunistic behavior is a primary
explanation for the century-long use of UACs. It arguably follows that
if market actors omit a direct prohibition of collusion in connection
with a considered move to CACs, they must not want one.
Alternatively, since the presence or absence of a prohibition could bear
on the contract price, the creditors must be unwilling to pay the price
of the extra protective term. Finally, the creditors may be relying on
reputational markets. Where markets impose reputational costs on
misbehaving debtors-for example, by raising their costs of
borrowing-and the court system is both expensive and error prone,
creditors may rationally decide not to purchase the right to go to court.
We question this line of reasoning from start to finish, reciting
our objections from finish to start.
The reference to reputational enforcement posits that creditors
prefer reputational sanctions over court-based enforcement. Borrowers
who misbehave towards their creditors do suffer reputationally. But,
199. See, e.g, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425, 426, 445 (1993); Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining
for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291, 324-25, 329-30 (1992).
[Vol. 57:1
SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM
as we have seen, the sovereign debt market specializes in long-term
forgiveness. 200  More importantly, even if market reputational
sanctions were significant and there were correspondingly high costs
of litigation, it does not follow that creditors would avoid putting a
protective term in the contract, if indeed a suitably drafted term were
available. Sovereign creditors already contract for numerous
enforcement provisions, despite the fact that direct enforcement
opportunities rarely occur. Avoiding the costs of going to court does
not seem to be a concern that determines the terms of sovereign debt
contracts.
Moving to the implication of consent from knowledge, drawing
inferences from contract silence about what the parties wanted at the
drafting table is a risky business. The parties could make either of two
provisions respecting good faith: They could specify that the contract
is governed by a good faith duty, or, if the parties wanted no backstop
protection, they could explicitly exclude good faith review. As a
predictive matter, each alternative seems equally likely. Yet neither
shows up in bond contracts, even though the current default position
of the law is somewhat unclear in the sovereign context. It follows that
the problem here cannot be solved as a matter of volition. What we
have is instead a normative problem: The burden to draft explicitly
must be allocated to one party or the other and this allocation stems
from a normative choice on the part of the judge.
Finally, we reach the argument that refraining from
intervention forces the parties to draft explicitly. This presupposes
that a complete menu of contingent contract terms is available to the
parties. The sovereign context, however, is full of unforeseeable
contingencies, a matter made worse by problems of observability and
verifiability. 20 1 Much of good faith and fiduciary law exists to provide
ex post solutions respecting such non-contractable subject matter.
We suspect that this is also the case where the experts do not
know how to draft explicit prohibitions. 20 2 Even though opportunistic
200. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
201. For contributions to the literature making this point, see Sanford Grossman & Oliver
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988). See also Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, Multitask Principal-
Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24
(1991) (showing that contracts that tie an agent's compensation to verifiable measures can divert
effort and attention from other more important but less easily measured aspects of performance).
202. That the creditor community is concerned about problems of opportunities arising as a
result of CACs is evidenced by the recent attempts to draft a "code of conduct." See Angela
Pruitt, Conduct Code in Emerging Markets Bridges Difference, DOW JONES CAP. MARKETS REP.,
2004]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
collusion between the debtor and a majority of its creditors is a known
possibility with CACs, it can show up in infinite guises.20 3 For
example, the contract could provide that any bondholder with a
commitment to lend to the bond issuer loses its vote. But a lender in
discussions with the sovereign about a future deal would not be picked
up by such a provision. Indeed, such conversations arguably should
not come at the cost of the vote and are hard to observe in the bargain.
Yet ex post, the conversation could occasion conduct viewed as bad
faith. Specificity with respect to prohibited relationships, such as bond
holding by entities controlled by the sovereign (who might later
collude with the sovereign against external lenders), also creates a
risk of overcoverage. What one era views as a suspect relationship can
be deemed harmless by the next generation. 2 4 Things like insider
borrowing-for example, a sovereign selling bonds to state run
entities-can be beneficial to the external creditors in cases where the
insiders are the only ones willing to lend.
In sum, determining whether there has been opportunism that
traverses the line of good faith involves a fact intensive, "you know it
when you see it" analysis. The job of policing therefore requires an
adjudicator.
B. Good Faith, Financial Contracts, and Sovereign Debt under CACs
But will the courts take responsibility and police sovereign debt
restructurings? Presumably, the projected CAC bonds still will be
governed by the law of New York. But there is precious little New
York law either on intercreditor duties specifically or sovereign bond
law more generally. It is likely, then, that a court confronted with the
good faith case posited here would look at general corporate bond law
and attempt to translate it to the sovereign context. Unfortunately,
good faith duties have been found to be essentially nonexistent in the
corporate bond context.
We argue that a successful contractual transition to CACs
would justify a move backwards in time from today's barren good faith
June 18, 2003. Perhaps more importantly, the one full scale move from UACs to CACs, that of
Uruguay, has provisions in it that take a first step at protecting against debtor opportunism. See
Felix Salmon, Uruguay Closes a Loophole, EUROMONEY, May 2003, at 101, 101.
203. See Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private
Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 917, 926-28
(2002).
204. This happened with the Trust Indenture Act, which as originally drafted offered a long
list of prohibited trustee relationships, all of which were deleted by the Congress in an
amendment thirty years later. S. REP. NO. 101-155 (1989).
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landscape to precedent from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, when courts demonstrated more of a willingness to step in
and block opportunistic behavior by creditors against each other.20 5
We propose a trade. For years, the official sector has been pleading for
CACs. Under pressure, the markets have reluctantly taken initial
steps towards them.20 6 We argue that there is a necessary "give back"
to support further forward movement and import long term stability:
Judicial policing of the opportunistic use of CACs in restructurings.
The trade implies costs for the domestic public sector, in the form of
additional work for certain courts. But that extra cost seems minimal
in comparison to the benefits gained from process improvements in
sovereign restructurings.20 7
1. The Negation of Good Faith
Recent generations of cases on bondholder rights teach that
lending relationships are arm's-length transactions among
sophisticated parties and that, absent an explicit contract term, there
are no constraints on borrower or intercreditor opportunism. 208 The
courts start with the premise that sophisticated parties enter into
bond contracts; parties capable of negotiating for the terms they
want.20 9 For a court to imply additional terms, ex post, would be to
frustrate their intent and add uncertainty.
205. See infra notes 234-240 and accompanying text.
206. In 1998 there was a bond issue by Thailand that was done with CACs, but this may
have been an aberration. See ELECTRICITY GENERATING AUTHORITY OF THAILAND, OFFERING
CIRCULAR (Oct. 13, 1998) (on file with authors). The most recent move towards attempting CACs
began with the filing of a shelf offering by Mexico (presumably under United States pressure)
where the stated intent was to use 75 percent majority action provisions for payment terms. See
John Authers, Mexico Pioneers Plan to Ease Debt, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at 25, 2002 WL
14178460.
207. The analysis of good faith in the sovereign context in this Article, builds on a
preliminary treatment in Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 104, at 1339-42.
208. There are a number of articles tackling the bondholder-stockholder conflict. See
Caroline M. Gentile, Allocating Risk and Control: The Role of Bond Covenants in Corporate
Governance, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (reviewing the literature). In 2003, we have
seen Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa, Turkey, and Korea, among others, move to
experimenting with CACs in their New York law bonds. Even prior to this, isolated issuances to
countries like Lebanon and Qatar were not enough to garner attention, let alone produce any
momentum for a market shift to CACs. On the prior issues, see MARK GUGIATTI & ANTHONY
RICHARDS, DO COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES INFLUENCE BOND YIELDS? NEW EVIDENCE FROM
EMERGING MARKETS 5-8 (Reserve Bank of Austl., Research Discussion Paper No. RPD 2003-02,
2003), http://www.rba.gov.au/rdp/RDP2003-02.pdf.
209. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1049 (2d Cir.
1982); see also Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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Accordingly, interpretation proceeds within the four corners of
the contract, even when a good faith breach is alleged. 210 The rule is
that no fiduciary or good faith duties run from the debtor to the
bondholders unless the opportunistic conduct violates an explicit
clause of the contract. This rule has been articulated despite black
letter law that all contracts are subject to an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. As articulated in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, good faith is a backstop duty intended to protect parties
who do not have specific contract provisions to protect them. 21 1 In the
majority of cases, to require a contract term first, as the rule for bonds
does, is to say "no good faith duty."212
To make out a claim for a breach of the narrow good faith duty
that applies to bond contracts, the bondholder plaintiff must
demonstrate that it is clear from the "express terms" of the contract
that a particular implied contract term would have been included in
the contract if the parties had negotiated over it.213 The result is that,
to the extent a debtor takes an action pursuant to an express clause of
the contract, the good faith argument is cut off.214 The court will not
step in when the debtor (or creditor) takes an action pursuant to the
express terms of the agreement, even if it happens to substantially
impair the realization of another party's contractual expectations.
2. Narrow Good Faith and Intercreditor Relationships
The leading intercreditor case is Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom,215
decided by the Eighth Circuit in 1953. It concerned an issue of real
210. See William W. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 120 n.123 (citing Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v.
Empire, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673 (1994) (holding that an implied covenant of good faith derives
substance directly from Indenture's language and cannot give debenture holders any rights
inconsistent with those set out in the Indentures) and Katz, 508 A.2d at 879 n.7 (holding that a
corporation's duty of good faith to bondholders differs from its duty to stockholders)).
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 204 cmt.d, 205 cmt.a (1981).
212. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 933-34 (2002).
213. Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992
(Del. 1998); Katz, 508 A.2d at 880; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied only
where the implied term is consistent with other mutually agreed upon terms in the contract).
214. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. at 1517 ("In contracts like bond indentures, 'an
implied covenant ... derives its substance directly from the language of the Indenture and
cannot give the holders of Debentures any rights inconsistent with those set out in the
Indenture."' (quoting Gardner & Florence, 589 F. Supp. at 673 (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
215. 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953).
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estate bonds left over from a depression era composition. Interest was
payable at 5 percent out of income only until maturity, which was
after ten years. 216 Thereafter, if the bonds were not paid down,
interest was an absolute 8 percent, a high coupon in those days.217
Before the tenth anniversary, a group holding a majority of the stock
of the issuer purchased a majority of the bonds.218 Unfortunately for
the bondholder minority, the bonds contained a CAC. The CAC gave
the dual majority a simple expedient on the tenth anniversary: Amend
the bonds to extend the maturity date another ten years. 219 The 5
percent out of income interest provision was thereby also extended. 220
This, as a practical matter, assured that no proceeds of the enterprise
ever entered the pockets of the minority bondholders-insiders easily
can manipulate things so that no "income" ever will exist. Had the
securities been common stock, majority to minority fiduciary duties
would have been available to protect the minority on this "freeze out"
fact pattern. But the Eighth Circuit slammed the door in the minority
bondholders' faces. 221
Aladdin Hotel was decided before the articulation of the
contemporary contract law good faith duty. But the case's spirit
activates the later intercreditor cases. Most have arisen in the
syndicated loan context. The courts proceed from the premise that the
parties are sophisticated commercial actors who have entered into an
arm's-length contract. Given this premise, the courts will not imply
good faith duties unless the parties expressly contract for them. 222
Hence, in First National Bank Ass'n v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
216. Id. at 628.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 633.
222. E.g., First Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d 510,
514 (9th Cir. 1990); Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 122 (2d
Cir. 1984); Banco Urquijo, S.A. v. Signet Bank, 861 F. Supp. 1220, 1249 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Banque
Arabe Et Internationale D'Investissement v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 819 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
There is one New York case that suggests that creditors in syndicated loan agreements have
meaningful obligations in the context of pursuing legal action against the debt. Credit Francais
Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiers de Comercio, C.A., 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 684 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
As the bulk of the case law cited demonstrates, however, this case has had little impact. For
criticisms of the case, see Lee C. Buchheit, Is Syndicated Lending a Joint Venture?, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Aug. 1985, at 12; Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reiser, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Process on Inter-creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 502-04. See also
Jeffery N. Brooks, Participation and Syndicated Loans: Intercreditor Fiduciary Duties for Lead
and Agent Banks Under U.S. Law, BUTTERWORTH J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L., June 1995, at 275.
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Commerce, when a group of banks in a syndicate entered into a
standstill agreement with the borrower following a missed interest
payment, the court rejected a minority member's argument that the
majority was obliged to declare a default.223 Similarly, in New Bank of
New England v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, when a majority of the
lenders did not vote to accelerate the debt, despite the occurrence of an
event of default, the court refused a minority lender's complaint that
the majority was obliged to vote to accelerate. 224
The syndicated bank loan cases, although rejecting a
mainstream good faith inquiry, can be read narrowly on their facts.
Thus.read, they stand for the proposition that when a majoritarian
modification occurs in a distress situation, includes an equal payout to
all the creditors, and involves no side deal between the majority and
the debtor, no violation of duties to the minority occurs. 225 Aladdin
Hotel presents more of a problem. It specifically involves bonds and
sustains a majoritarian amendment of the bond contract that effects a
manifestly unfair transfer of wealth from the minority to the majority.
One recent case, however, that does protect a bondholder
minority is Federated Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala Group
Jamaica, Ltd.226 There, a federal district court in New York barred an
Exit Amendment offer that looked unfair to minority holders. 227 The
amendments in question, effected under a CAC, would have
essentially stripped the debtor corporation of all of its assets and left
the dissenting creditors with only a shell against which to pursue
their claims. A strict reading of the precedent on coercive exchange
offers suggested that the debtor owed no significant good faith duty.
The court, however, faced with the unfairness of the offer, had little
trouble in deciding to block the transaction. 228
223. No. 3-93-366, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12105, at *14 (D. Minn. June 9, 1995).
224. 768 F. Supp. 1017, 1021-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of Slovn.,
984 F. Supp. 209, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting minority creditor's claim that agent was obliged
to declare an event of default and accelerate the debt-where the indenture required permission
from the majority creditors to accelerate-even though the particular minority holder had been
excluded from participating in the offer).
225. In any event, syndicated loan disputes do not translate easily to the context of a large
sovereign bond issue because the relationships among creditors in a syndicated loan tend to be
tighter and the creditors are likely to be more sophisticated (generally banks and other financial
institutions) than in the bond context.
226. No. 99 CIV 10517 HB, 1999 WL 993648 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1999). For a discussion of the
case, see Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 74, at 73.
227. Federated Strategic, 1999 WL 993648, at *7, 10.
228. Id. at *10. Similarly, in a later Yucyco case incarnation from the one discussed above,
Judge Chin was faced with a somewhat harsh action by the majority creditors. Yucyco, Ltd. v.
Republic of Slovn., 1999 WL 169530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1999). What the majority creditors did
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The bottom line still is that the case law gives a majority of
creditors wide rein in amending the terms of a bond contract pursuant
to an express term. But Mechala at least suggests that the door could
open for claims of bondholder majority to minority oppression. The
case becomes stronger when reference is made to cases antedating
Aladdin Hotel.
3. The Special Case of Sovereign Debt
Assume that the courts are not about to reconsider their
rejection of good faith duties in the corporate bondholder context.
There is nevertheless a case for an exception for sovereign bonds.
The contemporary rejection of intercreditor duties occurred in
the shadow of Chapter 11 and its predecessors. Inside Chapter 11, a
fiduciary regime including intercreditor duties comes to bear.229 This
protective regime takes tentative steps in pre-bankruptcy distress
situations, 230 but self-protection by contract otherwise prevails outside
of bankruptcy. The implicit judgment is that when they really need
was to consent to release the obligor banks from any and all claims under the prior debt
agreement. Id. at *2. Yucyco had not been permitted to participate in the exchange agreement
and yet had also lost its claims against the obligor banks. Id. As a formal matter, the court ruled
that the action of the majority creditors violated a "no amendment" clause. Id. But a plausible
argument was made by the defendants that this clause only applied to those items that had been
carved out as exceptions to the majority Modification clause. Id. at *3. The court, however, went
to something like a good faith rationale in saying: "A creditor would not have been likely to loan
substantial sums under an agreement that would permit important rights-such as the ability to
seek payment from certain obligors-to be extinguished by a simple vote of the majority of
creditors." Id.; see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad
Times and Good, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1821, 1833 (1992) ("Even if the terms of the bond contract
did not contain a term that expressly prohibited the debtor or its controlling stockholders from
voting on amendments, it is hard to imagine any court today that would interpret a 'majority
consent' provision to validate such a stripping of bondholders' entitlements." (footnote omitted)).
229. Under Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b), a reorganization plan may not "discriminate
unfairly." This is not a strict rule of pro rata treatment. Since the Code literally prohibits only
"unfair" discrimination, by implication it allows for discriminatory departures from pro rata
treatment so long as they are not "unfair." The justification is that the plan allocates a "surplus"
over liquidation value to which all creditors have not made a proportionate contribution. 7
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.04[3] [b] (Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1996).
The leading case, In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 590 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989), offers a four-
part test to determine whether discrimination is unfair: (1) whether the discrimination has a
reasonable basis, (2) whether the debtor can confirm a plan that does not discriminate, (3)
whether the discrimination is in good faith; and (4) how the plan treats the classes discriminated
against. For a critical discussion, see Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair
Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998).
230. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 275-90 (5th ed.
2002) (describing application of fraudulent conveyance law and fiduciary duty to protect creditors
in financial distress situations).
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it-in severe distress situations-bondholders get protection. But, so
long as the bond is paying, no solicitude need be extended. 231
Sovereign debt is different because no bankruptcy regime
protects sovereign creditors. It follows that bond contract law that
assumes bankruptcy's availability does not translate well to the
context of a distressed sovereign. 232 The doctrine, in effect, has a gap.
We would fill it by having a judge interpolate good faith intercreditor
duties in distress situations, especially in cases of opportunistic
behavior on the part of a bondholder group.
There is precedent with which to fill this gap. To find this case
law we have to look to the period prior to the creation of the federal
bankruptcy reorganization regime.233 During that era, distressed
corporate bond issuers and bondholders struggled in an environment
not dissimilar from that facing sovereign issuers and bondholders.
Unsurprisingly, the case law on bonds and bond contracts was
different. 234
The early twentieth century commentary suggests that a
majority of creditors seeking to impose a restructuring plan on a
dissenting minority owed the minority fiduciary duties.235  The
description of the duties as "fiduciary" may sound extreme today, but
in those days the term also covered territory covered by today's good
faith duty. Both commentators and judges from the period
contemplated that a majority-driven debt restructuring, in which
dissenting minorities were taking a haircut, would be subject to
scrutiny. 236 Leading cases such as the Second Circuit's decision in
231. See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
232. Cf. Tarullo, supra note 9, at 633-40 (explaining how the differences between sovereigns
and companies make it difficult to translate laws that govern companies to the sovereign
context).
233. On the federalization of bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line
Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 490-512 (1994).
234. Bratton, supra note 210, at 118 n.114 (citing Francis Lynde Stetson, Preparation of
Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral Trusts and Debenture Indentures, in STETSON ET AL.,
SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 25-27 (1917)
(justifying complexity of trust indentures, not on ground that no legal protection exists, but on
ground that implied-in-law protection is too uncertain)).
235. See, e.g., Charles H. Haines, Jr., Corporations-Modification Provisions of Corporate
Mortgages and Trust Indentures, 38 MICH. L. REV. 63, 67 (1939).
236. See Billyou, supra note 177, at 596-97 (describing the applicable law in England and
Canada and noting that modifications in the United States were subject to similar restrictions in
terms of court scrutiny); cf. Note, The Rights and Remedies of the Bondholder Under Corporate
Bonds and Indentures, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 584-86 (1927) (stating that the majority
bondholders were assumed to be acting in the best interests of the bond class, but suggesting
that the courts were especially concerned with collusive arrangement between the debtor and the
majority creditors).
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Hackettstown National Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co. 23 7 have
never been explicitly overruled. 238
The high water mark for discussions of majority-minority
intercreditor duties was the period between 1890 and 1930. The cases
and articles discussing them tended to involve the equity receivership.
This was a judicial device used in the pre-bankruptcy reorganization
era to assist firms, particularly railroads, whose distress implied
economic jeopardy for the community as a whole. In those days,
federal bankruptcy meant liquidation, which made no sense because
the railroads were worth more as going concerns than as liquidated
entities, and the economy depended on them in any event. The
distressed railroads were interstate entities, so state insolvency
receivership laws were inadequate to tackle their problems, and there
was no federal corporate reorganization mechanism. Hence, with the
urging and assistance of Wall Street lawyers, most prominently Paul
Cravath, the federal courts stepped in to supervise restructurings. 239
A creditor would go to a judge and ask for the appointment of a
receiver to take control of the debtor's assets. Eventually a creditor
majority would present a plan to the judge (a plan engineered by
insider shareholders, and their lawyers and investment bankers). The
judge would issue a decree that would enjoin creditors from enforcing
their claims against the reorganized corporation by using means other
than those provided for in the decree. Majority bondholders owed
relatively strong obligations to behave fairly towards minorities.
The precise contours of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century theory of intercreditor rights are difficult to discern, given
that the judicial opinions are context specific. Yet, we think it is clear
237. 74 F. 110 (2d Cir. 1896).
238. Hackettstown has language suggesting that creditors owe each other fiduciary duties.
Id. at 112-14. For the most part, however, the modern day bond cases do not mention it (perhaps
because the lawyers are not aware of it and do not raise it before the court). One recent case that
did tackle Hackettstown was CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886
F. Supp. 1105, 1115 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In CIBC, the plaintiffs were asking that the court rule
in their favor against what looked to be a collusive arrangement between the debtor and a large
debt holder (one of the debtor's instrumentalities) on the basis of the implied duties of good faith
among creditors. Id. at 1114. The CIBC court ignored the broad language in Hackettstown that
suggested fiduciary type duties existing among creditors and instead distinguished Hackettstown
by pointing to the different factually situation there. Id. at 1115 n.8.
239. For a description of these equity receiverships that sets them in the context of a history
of the developments in United States bankruptcy law, see DAVID SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001).
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that the level of concern for creditor rights during this period was
higher than it has been since World War J.240
4. English Intercreditor Duties
The commentators tell us that meaningful intercreditor duties
also obtained in English law during the early portion of the last
century. 241 That voice of English authority faded during the course of
the twentieth century, however. But, unlike United States contract
law, today's English law does not interpolate a line of cases that
rejects the proposition of good faith scrutiny of bond contracts. Until
recently, there simply were no cases. Meanwhile, British bond issues,
domestic and sovereign, have employed CACs, while British bank loan
contracts have tracked United States practice and combined UACs
and CACs. 242
The period of silence ended recently with the decision of
Redwood Master Fund Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd. by the High Court
in London.243 This intercreditor case suggests the possibility of good
faith scrutiny. The case involved a syndicated loan arrangement under
which the payment terms were covered by a UAC and the secondary
terms by a CAC. The debtor was in distress. A default on one of its
borrowings had triggered a cross default provision in the
instruments-"tranche A"-upon which the plaintiffs had purchased
exposure. The debtor had not yet drawn down the tranche A funds.
Given the default, it had no right to do so, which was fine with the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' problem was that other tranches had been
drawn down and the majority of the lenders held interests in both the
undrawn tranche A and the already-drawn tranches. A conflict of
interest resulted: Those who had already loaned money (and had not
been repaid) wanted to keep lending from tranche A because the loan
proceeds would flow through to repay the obligations from the other
240. Indeed, in the Depression era, bondholder interests appear to have been the primary
concern of the courts, legislatures, and policy makers. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means
Reconsidered at the Century's Thrn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 748 (2001); David A. Skeel, Jr., An
Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 1374-
75 (1998).
241. See Billyou, supra note 177, at 596-97 (citing materials).
242. See ARMOUR & DEAKIN, supra note 184.
243. 2002 WL 31676297 (Ch. Dec. 11, 2002). Given the rarity of such cases, the case received
considerable attention in the press (leading to articles with provocative titles such as "Bankers
win court battle over the future of lending") and that brought it to our attention. E.g., Rob
Mannix, Bankers Win Court Battle over the Future of Lending, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan., 2003, at
4, 4-5; Best Interests of Lenders Paramount, TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2003, 2003 WL 3100029;
Majority Banks: Authority, PLC MAG., Jan. 1, 2003, 2003 WL 12877470.
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tranches. Those who had not loaned, however, had no desire to see
their money be put to use for that purpose by a distressed company.
The clause governing a waiver of the default was a CAC. An 80
percent creditor majority used the CAC to waive the default. 244
Plaintiffs challenged, arguing that the majority's action violated the
majority's implied obligation to exercise its CAC power "in the best
interests of the class as a whole. '245
The court recognized that the majority had an obligation to
exercise its amendment power in good faith, but it found the plaintiffs'
reading of the good faith duty too expansive. The implied duty of good
faith, said the court, protected against actions that were "dishonest
abuses" of majority power and amounted to "fraud."246 Alternatively,
plaintiffs could win if they were to demonstrate that the exercise of
majority power had been "motivated by a malicious wish to damage or
oppress the interests of the minority.' '247 The duty did not extend so
far as to require that the majority make no changes that hurt one
subgroup more than another. It was in order to enable effective
decision making in such situations, the court explained, that the
decision-making power had been delegated to the majority. 248 The
minority's good faith reading, in contrast, amounted to a minority veto
right.249
The court stated that these cases have to be decided on their
individual facts and scrutinized for bad faith or fraud.250 On the facts
of the case, it found that the waiver was beneficial for the holders of
tranche A as a whole and that there was no bad faith or manifest
unfairness.251 Taken together, this suggests that, despite the outcome,
English courts will scrutinize the merits of cases where minorities
challenge the majority's action on a CAC. It is less clear whether the
case implies that good faith scrutiny was an active possibility in
244. Id. Subsequently, the consent of over 95 percent of the creditors in value was obtained.
Id.
245. Id. rn making their argument, plaintiffs pointed to the judgment in a 1927 dispute
between majority and minority shareholders, British America Nickel Corp., Ltd. v. M.J. O'Brien,
Ltd., [1927] A.C. 369, 371 (P.C. 1927), where Viscount Haldane said: "[T]he Power given [under
majority voting provisions] must be exercised for the purpose of benefiting the class as a whole,
and not merely individual members only." Redwood Master Fund, 2002 WL 31676297.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. Plus, the parties in a syndicated loan arrangement were sophisticated parties who
knew what kind of arrangement they were getting into at the outset. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
2004]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1
England throughout the twentieth century, thereby helping to explain
the persistence of CACs in London issue bonds. But some inferences
can be drawn. The parties in Redwood Fund vigorously contested
what the common law precedents dictated, suggesting that the
historical practice did not predict a clear result. At the same time, the
absence of recent case law, taken together with the serious reception
accorded the plaintiffs argument, suggests a standing expectation of
judicial scrutiny.25 2
5. The Contrary View
We fight a rear guard action in arguing for good faith. At first
cut, the sovereign context looks much the same as the traditional
corporate one. Sophisticated parties enter into detailed contracts. The
sovereign debt cases from recent years suggest that courts view things
this way.
252. A hint as to the historical understandings of intercreditor obligations is also contained
in a recent review of a private bankruptcy settlement by the Supreme Court of Judicature. In
reaching its decision that the private settlement was void, the court found that there was an
implicit good faith duty among creditors. Somji v. Cadbury Schweppes, PLC, 2000 WL 1881249
(Ch. Dec. 20, 2000).The court, although explicit that it was not relying on cases prior to 1996,
stated that
the deputy judge's impressive survey of old law [predating the Bankruptcy
Act of 1996] shows that in relation to compositions and arrangement with
creditors the court did impose a strict requirement of good faith as between
competing unsecured creditors ... [and although] there is no strong
presumption that a similar presumption must be found in the new regime
[created in 1996] ... (to put it at its lowest) it would be no great surprise to
find it in there in one form or another.
Id.
Although we articulated intercreditor duties as good faith obligations, an English court
might also characterize them as either fiduciary or implied duties. English law appears to
contemplate both possibilities. On fiduciary duties, English law appears to keeps a fairly open
definition of such duties and often adds fiduciary relationships as it sees fit. See J. Beatson,
ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 267-68 (28th ed. 2002). The three broad categories of fiduciary duties
that already exist are as follows: relationships of trust and confidence; relationships of
powerlinfluence/discretion; and relationships of confidentiality. See P.J. Millett, Equity's Place in
the Law of Commerce, 114 LAw Q. REV. 214, 219-21 (1998); see also Alexander F.H. Lokem,
Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Joint Ventures, J.B.L. at 550-
56 (Nov. 1999). One could argue that intercreditor duties fit either of the first two categories.
Moving to implied duties (and it is worth noting that the judge in Redwood Masters used the
concepts of "good faith" and "implied duties" interchangeably at times), there appear to be three
types of implied terms: (1) terms that the parties probably had in mind but did not bother to add
in the contract, (2) terms that the parties, regardless if they had them in mind, would have
agreed to if the issue was raised, and (3) terms that, regardless of whether they had them in
mind, would have added to the contract if they had foreseen the difficulty. Glanville Williams,
Language and the Law, 61 LAW Q. REV. 71, 401 (1945). Depending on context, intercreditor
duties could fit into any one of the three categories.
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In Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru,
the borrower's lawyers argued that the court should use principles of
comity to thwart an enforcement action by a holdout creditor.253 The
Second Circuit said no. Writing for the panel, Judge Calabresi
explained that the United States interest in allowing contract
enforcement actions trumped the need for a smooth debt resolution
process:
First, the United States encourages participation in, and advocates the success of, IMF
foreign debt resolution procedures under the Brady Plan. Second, the United States has
a strong interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts under the principles of
contract law, and in particular, the continuing enforceability of foreign debts owed to
United States lenders. The second interest limits the first so that, although the United
States advocates negotiations to effect debt reduction and continued lending to
defaulting foreign sovereigns, it maintains that creditor participation in such
negotiations should be on a strictly voluntary basis. It also requires that debts remain
enforceable throughout the negotiations.
2 5 4
Similarly, in Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion,255
the same court rejected another sovereign plea. This time the request
was that the court use principles of champerty to block the holdout
creditor's actions. 256 The court quoted Judge Calabresi's language from
Pravin Bankers and explained that it was not going to take an action
against the holdout creditor that in effect produced an involuntary
"cram down. ' 257 We point these cases out to flag two things. First,
their tone is hostile to the notion of intercreditor obligations. Second,
that hostility appears to follow from the courts' perception of United
States interests. We discuss the importance of the second point later.
Finally, CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do
Brasi1258 involved a sovereign debtor, an intercreditor dispute, and a
discussion of intercreditor law from the turn of the twentieth century.
CIBC Bank bears a factual resemblance to Aladdin Hotel. The
plaintiffs were minority holders of Brazilian debt under a syndicated
loan agreement. 259 One of the other lenders in the syndicate was
Banco do Brasil ("BdB"), an instrumentality of the state. 260 Brazil had
defaulted on its obligations and CIBC wished to accelerate the debt.261
253. 109 F.3d 850, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1997).
254. Id. at 855 (citations omitted).
255. 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
256. Id. at 369.
257. Id. at 380.
258. 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
259. Id. at 1107.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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Through the debt holdings of BdB, however, Brazil was able to block
CIBC's attempt to accelerate because the contract required a vote of
more than 50 percent of the creditors and BdB owned 51 percent. 262
Citing old intercreditor duty cases such as Hackettstown, the plaintiff
argued that the collusive arrangement between Brazil and BdB
violated the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing.263 The court,
however, stated that the old case law was inapplicable because it
involved "compositions," that is, restructuring agreements that the
parties make when the debtor is insolvent.264 This case, it explained,
was about a contract dispute, and the plaintiff knew fully well at the
time of contracting with Brazil that BdB was a lender.265 Hence, had
the lenders wanted a clause that restricted BdB from having its votes
counted, they should have asked for it at the outset.266
The case repeats the hard line that no implied duties obtain in
respect of action explicitly authorized by the contract.267 That said,
the court failed to confront the old cases and commentaries. First, it is
not clear that intercreditor duties existed only in the context of a
composition or insolvency. As discussed, the language about
intercreditor duties from that period appears stronger. 268 Second,
Brazil was indeed going through a composition; Brazil had defaulted
on its debt and had to renegotiate. The plaintiff was a minority
creditor suing under the old debt instruments because it did not want
to go along with the new plan Brazil had proposed.
C. Summary
The CIBC court should have scrutinized the deal. Whether it
would have found anything is another question. Similarly, a bond
market shift from UACs to CACs should be viewed as a material
262. Id.
263. The Hackettstown decision was pointed out to the court by the plaintiffs in a
supplemental letter to the briefs. See id. at 1115 n.8; see also Letter from Martin London,
Attorney, Paul Weiss Rifkind & Wharton, to Judge Loretta A. Preska, U.S. District Judge (May
1, 1995) (on file with authors).
264. CIBC Bank & Trust Co., 886 F. Supp. at 1115.
265. Id. at 1116-17.
266. Id. at 1117.
267. Judge Preska quotes the following language from Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), one of the standard cases in modern
debtor-creditor law: "In contracts like bond indentures, an implied covenant derives its
substance directly from the language of the Indenture, and cannot give the holders of Debentures
any rights inconsistent with those set out in the Indenture." CBIC Bank & Trust Co., 886 F.
Supp. at 1116.
268. See supra notes 234-240.
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change in circumstances justifying a shift to good faith scrutiny. For
endorsement of this assertion, we look to no less an authority than the
United States Treasury.
We think the Treasury, having promoted CACs, has a
responsibility to intervene in subsequent litigation to explain the new
regime and its implications for the judicial role. There is precedent for
such intervention. In Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, Costa Rican banks had defaulted on their
obligations as the result of their government's decision to restrict
outflows of foreign exchange. 269 170 out of 171 creditors agreed to a
composition. 270 The one holdout accelerated its debt. 271 The Second
Circuit, in its first hearing of the case, and consistent with what it
perceived to be the creditors' interest in an orderly restructuring of the
debt, blocked the acceleration. 272 On rehearing en banc, however, the
Justice Department informed the court that the government's policy,
while favorably disposed to orderly restructurings, primarily favored
allowing the creditors to enforce their contracts. 273 In other words,
private ordering (and holdouts) were to trump the policy rationale that
had guided the court's first decision. The resulting en banc decision of
the Second Circuit reversed the court's earlier position.27 4 This policy
position was later echoed in Judge Calabresi's opinion in Pravin
Banker275 and then again in Banco de la Nacion.276
If the government were to make a similar appearance today, it
presumably would state the opposite position. 277 From the public's
269. 757 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1985). The Allied Bank decision and creditors' coordination
problem in the absence of sovereign bankruptcy were much discussed issues in the mid-1980s.
See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Comity and Sovereign Debt Litigation: A Bankruptcy Analogy, 10
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 29 (1986); Andrew C. Quale, Jr., Allied Banks' Effect on International
Lending, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1985, at 26; Ruben Sklar, Renegotiation of External Debt: The
Allied Bank Cases and the Chapter 11 Analogy, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 59 (1984); Roger
M. Zaitzeff & C. Thomas Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
449 (1985).
270. Bainbridge, supra note 269, at 29.
271. Id.
272. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 519-20.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 523. On Allied Bank, see Tarullo, supra note 9, at 676 and more generally,
Bainbridge, supra note 269.
275. 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
276. 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
277. See Tarullo, supra note 9, at 676 (pointing out that the Justice Department can inform a
court that the government's policy had changed (while also suggesting that it is not clear a court
would depart from the pattern of literal enforcement of debt contracts)). While the government
policy in Allied Bank was to urge the court to allow the non cooperating creditors to sue, that
position had softened by the time of the CIBC case, where the United States government amicus
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perspective-one where the rich countries want to avoid bailouts and
the poor countries want to avoid the pain presently suffered by
Argentina-the goal should be to help CACs survive. If the courts fail
to police opportunistic behavior, the markets likely will move back to
UACs, as opposed to undertaking the daunting task of contracting for
more explicit good faith duties. The government accordingly could tell
the courts that public policy considerations point towards a default
rule of meaningful good faith intercreditor duties.
In sum, we project that the courts could be persuaded to turn to
the old equity receivership cases (especially if supported by an amicus
brief from the United States government). Such scrutiny would not
prevent a majority of creditors from taking actions to enable a
restructuring of a distressed sovereign's debt. It would simply enable a
displeased minority creditor to ask for review of the majority's
modification plan. That heightened judicial scrutiny would bring with
it heightened uncertainty and the possibility that the modification
plan will be set aside. But that is not a bad thing if creditors are
concerned about coercive modifications and the scrutiny lends comfort.
In the long run, creditors who feel safer will be more willing to lend.
We are left with two sets of solutions at different ends of the
spectrum. Under the prevailing weak good faith doctrine, the majority
of creditors under a CAC can use modification terms to solve the
holdout problem. The problem is the risk of oppressive majority action.
The result is the bondholders' preference for UACs, which in turn
creates the holdout problem. To persuade creditors to move to, and
stay with, the use of CACs, they need a substitute for the protections
that UACs otherwise provide them. Key among these protections are
good faith duties.
One solution would be to include these gap-filling duties within
a new statutory bankruptcy scheme for sovereigns. There are reasons
for preferring a statutory scheme over contractual modification.278
But the only plausible statutory scheme on the table today is that of
the IMF and neither the creditors, the debtors, nor the United States
Treasury want anything to do with it.279 That means that the most
brief expressed concern about the actions of vulture creditors. See Charles D. Schmerler,
Litigating Defaults on Sovereign Debt Law, Policy Struggle to Defer to Foreign States While
Honoring Lenders'Rights, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 2002, at S1.
278. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All, 52 EMORY L.J.
417 (2003).
279. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 184, 196-97 (describing the United States Treasury's
views on CACs, where although the United States prefers CACs to the SDRM, it serves its
purposes to keep the threat of the SDRM open so as to induce the markets to try CACs); A Better
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likely solution will be a move to CACs under New York contract
law.280 For that solution to remain stable, the courts interpreting
these contracts need to read implied duties into the contracts.
VI. CONCLUSION
When a policymaker from Washington asks a bondholder to
exchange her UAC bond for a new bond with a CAC, the bondholder
will be suspicious. "Policy," after all, often means a loss of value
inflicted to advance someone else's agenda. Recent debates in
Washington do not allay such suspicions. The talk centers on ways to
make sure that, when help is extended, none of it comes the
bondholders' way. At a time when the value of the bondholders'
investments has plummeted, institutions not known to make sacrifices
themselves sternly lecture the bondholders on the need to take less. In
such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that the bondholders resist
reform.
If the policymakers expect the bondholders to exchange UACs
for CACs, they will have to allay their fears. This accommodation
could come in the form of money, but there is no money. We offer
several second best solutions. First, the policymakers need to
emphasize that sovereign bondholders reasonably can be asked to
make give ups only as a means to the end of creating surpluses. Then
the policymakers need to state that the fair division of those surpluses
is their top policy priority. To make that statement credible, they need
to confront the deficit in legal protection. When compared to their
corporate counterparts, sovereign creditors already have fewer
protections. 281  To delimit these protections without providing a
credible substitute creates the risk that the creditors will take their
money and play elsewhere. 28 2
Way to Go Bust, supra note 13, at 64 (reporting that "most financiers, whether bankers or
bondholders, loathe the SDRM"), available at 2003 WL 6244817.
280. See Miller, supra note 1, at 184, 196-97.
281. See SHLEIFER, supra note 2, at 5-10.
282. See id. at 4-5 (reviewing evidence showing that where creditor and shareholder rights
receive more protection, investment levels are higher and markets are thicker).
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